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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This book discusses different topics from phenomenology to philosophy of 
language; the topics discussed belong to different areas of philosophy even if  it is 
possible to find a fil rouge that enables the reader to achieve a transversal point of 
view. 
If we consider the idea of a basic antireductionism common to the topics of this 
book, it can be seen apparently that a diversity of themes with which we are 
concerned disappears in favor of an homogeneity of sense which pervades the 
arguments treated. 
An important achievement of these essays is the weakening of the idea of the 
immediacy of knowledge: in Harvey’s and Hintikkas’ interpretation of Husserl’s 
thought, the opposition to the immediacy of knowledge rests on the assumption 
that there would be a mutual infiltration between the precategorial (sensible) and 
the categorial (rational) levels of experience so that the idea of a founding stratum 
of every possible experience could lose sense; Hintikka’s and Harvey’s suggestion 
is that we ought to index, through “hinge-concepts”, the direction of the 
phenomenological analysis as a movement from the predicative level to a 
“rationally reconstructed” prepredicative one.  
In the essay “Thing and Space in Husserl”, the task of  the theoretical reason is to 
show how the things conceived by the scientific and the natural thinking would be 
by-products of a construction upon the unitary and meaningful world of everyday 
experience: in this sense objective space is constituted through the concatenation 
of places available to me in my kinesthetically felt “near-sphere”.  
Sellars, from his point of view, denies that there would be a basic level at which 
knowledge would be a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if 
immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge. The major 
point of Sellars’ view is the idea that numerous tensions are hidden in sense-
datum theories, loyal to the myth of the Given,  that can be characterized in these 
terms: 
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a) knowledge of facts versus knowledge of particulars; 
b) learned versus unlearned cognitive capacities; 
c) factualism about knowledge versus non-naturalism about knowledge; 
d) inner episodes as causal intermediaries of empirical knowledge versus 
inner episodes as epistemic intermediaries of empirical knowledge.  
Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both instrumentally 
and non epistemically: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor 
are they primordial knowings; they would belong to the causal order rather than 
to the cognitive one . 
Sensations mediate and guide our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if this 
knowledge is not a second-class knowing  inferred i.e. from the knowledge of 
items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is direct but mediated. 
For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are states of 
perceivers that are non epistemic in character and depending on external causes; 
sensations are a necessary condition of the intentional order, even if they do not 
belong to this order. 
Wittgenstein, on his part, retains that the many-dimensional character of colour 
concepts  makes them ineffable, so that every attempt goes wrong to reduce them 
to a more primitive ostensive game: colour concepts or colour words have a 
certain degree of vagueness, so that it results very difficult to achieve some 
sharpness or to draw boundaries; this task belongs to logic, not to the everyday 
language.   
If we  try to face the language game played by colour words, we cannot recur to 
“pen-and-ink” conceptual schemes even if some, as it were, “regularities”, some 
“unassailable”  truths (e.g. the octahedron frame) must be presupposed to match 
colour issues. In our attempt to describe uses of colour-words, we must admit that 
1) some sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the 
empirical; 2)  in philosophy it is not enough in every case to say something about 
an object, but also to learn how to speak about it. 
What characterizes the following essays is also a certain degree of 
antireductionism and a mitigated use of an a priori way of looking to 
phenomenological or linguistic questions: in the case of the study on the 
prepredicative and the predicative layers of our experience of the world, the 
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antireductionist option is testified by the philosophical belief that the silent layer 
of the prepredicative experience has not the privilege of a full and immediate 
contact with reality, since every encounter of the world is mediated by culture, 
language, theoretical and practical habits which jeopardize the task of arriving at 
the “immediacy” of  the experience; the a priori structures which  preside over the 
experience of the world have an hermeneutical load due to the fact that  every 
experience is already saturated with anticipations which are permeated by a 
certain degree of typical familiarity  and precognizance. 
In the essay “Thing and space in Husserl” the antireductionist line is showed by 
the importance of the Body, the lived body,  for the constitution of the three-
dimensional space, since thanks to my Body I am at the center of things and 
everything in my immediate surrounding is given a location. Husserl posits 
between the lived body and the objective space a Sehraum, a purely visual space, 
in order to make the objective space a lived space: the visual space has its own 
system of places (Ortssystem) which are never given without kinesthetic 
motivations which here, together with the pre-empirical qualities of things (size, 
color and so on), function as a priori constraints on our apprehension of the world. 
As regards Sellars the antireductionist character of his thought would rest in a way 
of approaching the philosophical enterprise which can be defined holistic: 
knowledge cannot be conceived as an accurate representing, the “mirror of 
nature”, since such accuracy would require a theory of privileged representations 
which cannot be approved; justification is not a matter of a special relation 
between ideas and objects, but of conversation, of social practice. The American 
philosopher maintains traces of a priori boundaries of our world experience in the 
sense of conceptual schemes, for example the manifest or the scientific images of 
the world, even if these patterns or set of categories we operate with are 
potentially dynamic, changing under the impact of both experience and reflection: 
in this sense he seems to be more Hegelian than Kantian. 
In the essay on Wittgenstein, the antireductionist flavor of his thought manifests 
itself in the idea that in order to get clear the idea about the meaning of a term like 
“colour”, one does not have to find the common element present in all its 
applications, because such an approach would dismiss as irrelevant the concrete 
cases. Questions regarding the use of the term “colour” are very important for 
10 
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they help clearing up relevant problems concerning, i.e., the relation between 
logic and experience, or language and perception. Such questions are so strongly 
linked that a reductionist approach is not able to tackle them. 
11 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL REMARKS ON PREPREDICATIVE 
AND PREDICATIVE IN HUSSERL 
 
Summary 
My aim is to discuss Hintikka’s and Harvey’s suggestion according to which we 
ought to “index” the direction of the phenomenological analysis in terms of a 
movement from the predicative level to a “rationally reconstructed” prepredicative 
one. 
Such an assumption amounts, in my point of view, not to a mere reformation of 
the phenomenological enterprise, but much more to its radical removal: this 
assumption, as a matter of fact, carries with it the consequence that the idea of a 
founding stratum of every possible experience has no more sense; moreover, even 
the idea of the immediacy of knowledge, correlated with the former, is strongly 
weakened since notions as “thematic decision” or “thematic interest” are deprived 
of their  prepredicative sense and intended as “hinge-concepts” in order to 
guarantee the passage from the categorial to the precategorial and conversely. 
If  Hintikka’s and Harvey’s strategy has the merit of making manifest Husserl’s 
negligence of the importance of language, to some extent considered as a by-
product  of a more fundamental stratum, the same strategy, however, fails to 
appreciate the attempt made by Husserl of entwining receptive experience and 
predicative spontaneity, making use of  notions such as “typical familiarity” or 
“precognizance”. 
Hintikka’s and Harvey’s analysis seems then suffering from an excess of 
oversimplification: but in other words, if all appears in contexts of 
meaningfulness, that is, of categorial formations, not all, as a matter of fact, can 
be reduced to a culturally determined experience. 
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1. From the prepredicative experience to the predicative judgment 
In the essay “Modalization and Modalities”1 Charles Harvey and Jaakko Hintikka 
attempt to evaluate Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of the genesis of 
primitive logical connectives like negation and disjunction. 
This essay is mainly concerned with Husserl’s analysis of modalization in 
Experience and Judgment: modalized forms of consciousness occur when the 
doxastic certainty that pervades our daily lives is obstructed; suspicion then 
infiltrates the initial certainty that, in turn, becomes modalized. 
By analyzing the modalized form of negation, Husserl traces the possibility of this 
logical connective to a primitive certainty which takes the world as “the universal 
ground of belief pregiven for every experience of individual objects”.2 Once the 
negation of a simple belief occurs, then a retroactive modification of the retentive 
stream of consciousness takes place: 
 
…the noematic modification stems back in the form of a retroactive cancellation in the retentional 
sphere and modifies the production of sense stemming from earlier phases of the perception.3 
 
As with negation, also in the case of disjunction, a background of certainty is 
presupposed, even if the Urdoxic consciousness is always pervaded by an element 
of possibility: the “open possibilities”, which characterize the life of 
intentionality, are primitive forms of conjunction on the ground of which 
disjunction or negation are possible; thereby, consciousness of possibilities is 
itself an intrinsic feature of simple certainty. 
More important thing, however, is the description of how predicative modalities 
would emerge from prepredicative experience and the reflection on the grounding 
relation subsisting between the precategorial and the categorial dimension. 
Husserl states that an actual predicative judgment (an act of confirmation, for 
example) happens only after the challenging of an earlier simple certainty by 
some doubt or optionality; thereby, confirmatory judgment always has the form of 
“a decision and of taking a position with regard to what has become doubtful”.4 
According to Hintikka and Harvey, the notion of reflective and thematic decision 
is an ‘hinge-concept’, as it is the notion of prereflective interest in the sphere of 
passivity, that swings us from prepredicative modalization to the domain of 
13 
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predicative modal judgments. They however add that this transition, analyzed by 
Husserl, from the prepredicative experience to the predicative judgment is “an  
awkward one”: 
 
For, in turning to descriptions of predicative judgment Husserl must use the very same predicative 
language that he had to use to describe the prepredicative experience. Yet, in large part at least, the 
domain of prepredicative experience is a sublingual domain of happenings.5  
 
2. The language argument 
It seems, in Harvey’s and Hintikka’s point of view, that Husserl’s understanding 
of higher level predicative language has been ‘smuggled back’  into the analyses 
of lower level prepredicative experience; this presumed lacking of clarity in 
Husserl’s understanding of the right relation between the above mentioned levels 
of the life of consciousness, is due, in their point of view, to the negligence, in 
Husserl’s analyses, of the dimension of language that would stain even the silent 
stratum of experience. 
Harvey and Hintikka point out that: 
 
The problem posed by the language argument is that (1) it is not clear how Husserl’s descriptions 
of the “silent stratum” of experience can make sense without staining that privileged stratum with 
the ambiguities of language; and (2), once so stained, it is not clear that this privileged stratum is 
or ever was ‘privileged’ by a purified transcendental quietude in direct contact with sense.6 
 
Moving from Harvey’s and Hintikka’s position, the silent layer of experience 
would have not the privilege of a full and immediate contact with the sense; for 
the same reason, Derrida’s task of washing up the most important  notions of 
phenomenology, as “presence”, “evidence”, “selfgiveness”, in the muddy flux of 
the living language, maintains some plausibility.7 
At this point of analysis then, it might have some theoretical consequences to 
stress the point that every encounter of the world is mediated by culture, linguistic 
structures, theoretical and practical habits (Kleidungen) which jeopardize the task 
of arriving at the “immediacy” (Unmittelbarkeit) of the experience which, in 
itself, turns out to be a patient work of balancing its descriptive content with its 
14 
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hermeneutical load due the linguistic tradition into which experience has been 
expressed.  
Ludwig Landgrebe explicates the idea as follows:    
 
Wenn damit ein neuer Weg der Erschliessung der unmittelbaren Erfahrung gewiesen ist, so treten 
in der Durchführung dieses Programms doch Schwierigkeiten auf, die zeigen, dass dieser Weg für 
sich allein nicht genügen kann....Aber solche reine Beschreibung bedarf der Ausdrücke, in denen 
das Beschriebene erfasst wird, und wenn wir auf Erlebnisweisen reflektieren, so hat eine mehr als 
200jährige Tradition die zu Termini verfestigten Ausdrücke geschaffen, in denen das Erleben, das 
Bewusstsein und seine Weisen erfasst warden.8 
 
Additionally, he states the following: 
 
Der Weg zum Unmittelbaren der Erfahrung ist also ein Ineinander von Deskription und kritischer 
Prüfung der dabei zunächst naiv angewandten Termini auf ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung hin....Nur 
in solchem Ineinander von Deskription und “Destruktion” kann sich die Erschliessung des 
Unmittelbaren der Erfahrung als eine Bewegung der Auslegung, Hermeneutik vollziehen.9  
 
3. The reverse constitution 
The proposal made by Harvey and Hintikka to overcome the theoretical 
perplexities tied to Husserl’s conception of the relation between the precategorial 
and the categorial spheres turns on the insight that any link  between these two 
level must proceed from the predicative side: 
 
This is because not only do higher level idealities “modify” lower level prepredicative 
experiences, but their retroactive effect is also one of “reverse constitution”. And it is simply not 
clear that epoche and reduction can untangle us from the effects of such reverse constitution.10  
 
It  would be noteworthy to establish if a reversing of the relation subsisting 
between the predicative sphere and the prepredicative one, made possible by the 
priority assigned to the former, does justice to the fact that we live in a cultural 
world in which even ideal objectivities have their full-fledged reality. 
Hintikka’s and Harvey’s suggestion is that we ought to “index” the direction of 
the phenomenological analysis as a movement from the predicative level to a 
“rationally reconstructed” prepredicative one, considering constituted idealities 
15 
Philosophical exercises. Inquiries into phenomenology and philosophy of language 
 
not only as clues (as for Husserl), but also as instruments  that “would actively 
lead us back to, and help us to rationally reconstruct the sphere of the 
prepredicative experience”.11  
Because of the continuity of the passage from one sphere to the other and  of the 
mutual infiltration between the precategorial and the categorial levels of 
experience, the idea of a founding stratum of every possible experience loses 
sense. 
Even the belief of the immediacy of  knowledge, as a consequence of the 
theoretical position above proposed, is weakened, in a quasi-Sellarsian sense, 
insofar as notions as “thematic decision” or “thematic interest” are completely 
deprived of their prepredicative sense and intended as “hinge-concepts” in order 
to grant the passage from the categorial to the precategorial and conversely. 
If we want to hold fast to the promises of phenomenology and if we want to see it 
as a particular philosophy of language, we ought to be compelled, following 
Husserl’s insight,  to consider language as a by-product of a more fundamental 
stratum: in Experience and Judgment some aspects of linguistic acts,  for example 
predication, are considered as founded in the pre-predicative experience which is 
not formed by language. 
Husserl’s most important thesis in this work is that the exercises of the logical 
reason, in particular judgment and predication, would depend on a suitable 
experiential basis which can be analyzed in abstraction from the language used in 
the categorial dimension; then according to this point of view pre-linguistic 
experience would be preorganized into rough types which lay down expectations 
on the basis of past perceived similarities. These bundles of data are not a 
featureless clump, since they contain independent pieces and dependent moments: 
when we perceive an object, we highlight a piece or a moment of the same, while 
retaining the whole in implicit grasp: the part here is highlighted not just per se, 
but as part of the whole; moving back and forth our attentive grasp, we carry out 
an operation which is the germ of predication. 
Husserl calls this operation “explication”: for instance, in the tree seen, I explicate 
its trunk (piece) or its color (moment); even if the part is taken as an object in its 
own right, it is considered however as a part belonging to and emerging from the 
prior whole; it results, as a matter of fact, a threefold structure: whole, part, and 
16 
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the part-whole relation from which emerges the basic structure of all predication: 
subject, attribute and copula. Once explication has started, its results can be 
casted upon the subject and the procedure may continue: for instance, from the 
predicative judgment “S is p” we can move to the attributive one “S, which is p, is 
q”, and so on. 
Through further investigation on the nature of the essential intuition, that is to say, 
of the method of eidetic variation whereby we are placed in cognitive contact with 
universals, Husserl’s philosophical enterprise, according to some critical scholars, 
would show its most plausible shortage for even universals would show no trace 
of linguistic activity. 
Peter Simons explains the sense of Husserl’s misunderstanding of the role of 
language in experience with the following words: 
 
That at least some such universals are fed us predigested by language appears not to concern 
Husserl. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy of language, the social dimension of language, the 
fact that it is a community affair which is learnt interactively with already competent language 
users, and the constraints on learning imposed by this fact, are underemphasized. In part this is the 
result of bracketing other people and the social world, retaining for phenomenological 
consideration only our sense of these things, but for the most part he is simply not interested in 
anything but individual consciousness.12  
 
4.The entwining of receptive experience and predicative spontaneity 
What does Husserl precisely  say about the above arisen questions? 
In my opinion the paragraph 49 of Experience and Judgment dispels some above 
emerged  doubts, since Husserl states here that, even if we ought to distinguish 
two levels of interest, and corresponding to these, two levels of objectifying 
operations: on the one hand, the receptive experience, on the other hand, the 
predicative spontaneity, this distinction, however, cannot be construed “as if 
different operations were somehow separate from each other”. Only for the sake 
of the analysis, the two levels are separated, even if they, as a rule, are actually 
closely entwined; this means that the receptive experience is not something 
independent, as if it were necessary first to run through a chain of receptive 
experiences before there could be an activation of cognition: for instance, we 
could at first thematize an object  exclusively in the interest of cognition. These 
17 
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few words however don’t encourage us to assert that Husserl would have accepted 
the “reverse constitution” paradigm proposed by Harvey and Hintikka. 
Husserl, in fact, explicates that: 
 
These levels are, to be sure, always erected one upon the other; each step of the predication 
presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only that can be originally 
predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended, and explicated.13  
 
The same thing holds, according to Husserl, for a third and highest level, that of 
conceptualizing thought and formation of generalities; for every act of predicative 
judgment, every constitution of predicative forms includes in se , at the same time, 
a formation of generalities. 
At this point of analysis, it is suitable to introduce the notions of familiarity and 
sedimentation that can play  a role so as to defend Husserl from Hintikka’s and 
Harvey’s objections. 
Just as every object of receptivity stands forth from the beginning as an object of a 
type known in some manner or other, so correlatively, says Husserl, in every 
predicative formation it already takes place a determination as this or that “on the 
basis of expressions inseparably entwined with every predication and on the basis 
of the general significations pertaining to these expressions”.14  
If, for instance, we make a judgment of perception of the simplest form, e.g. “S is 
p”, determining this particular object S as green, then in this “being-determined-
as-green” there is contained implicitly, by virtue of the  generality of the 
expression “green”, the relation to the general essence “green”, although this 
relation is not made thematic as in the expression “this is a green object”. 
 
5. Typical familiarity and precognizance 
The originality of an experience never implies, according to Husserl, an 
apprehension and an explication of an object which is completely unknown: on 
the contrary, the process which takes place in an original intuition is already 
saturated with anticipation: 
 
18 
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… there is always more cointended apperceptively (apperzeptiv mitgemeint) than actually is given 
by intuition- precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an 
object in its horizon of typical familiarity (typischen Vertrautheit) and precognizance 
(Vorbekanntheit).15  
 
The apprehension of an object thus is never something ephemeral for, 
notwithstanding its progressive sinking into corresponding nonoriginal modes 
(retentional reverberation, empty dead past), it in no way disappears without a 
trace:  
 
With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus, ready at 
any time to be awakened anew by an active association.16  
 
At every stage of the process of object constitution, there is a “precipitate” 
(Niederschlag) of cognitions in habitus: the object has incorporated into itself the 
“forms of sense” (Sinnesgestalten) originally constituted in the acts of explication 
by virtue of a knowledge that has the form of a habitus (habituelles Wissen). 
Alfred Schuetz gives much credit to Husserl’s account of the knowledge process, 
maintaining that the apprehension of objects takes place always inside the frame 
of an unquestioned (even if questionable) belief: 
 
They [objects] are pregiven to us in the unquestioned (although always questionable) assurance of 
an uncontested belief, and thus not on the ground of a particular act of positing, and still less on 
the ground of an existential judgment. But our experience of these given objects shows two 
characteristics: in the first place, all objects of our experience have from the outset the character of 
typical familiarity; in the second place, the process of our apperceiving these objects by originary 
intuition is always permeated by anticipations of not actually apperceived but cointended 
features.17  
 
The typicality of the objects apprehensions depends on their calling forth the 
recollection  of other objectivities similar or even like the former; on the ground 
of it, other objectivities of a similar kind are apperceived by “apperceptive 
transference” (apperzeptive Uebertragung), from the outset, as objectivities of the 
same type, of a pregiven more or less specific familiarity.18  
19 
Philosophical exercises. Inquiries into phenomenology and philosophy of language 
 
In these few remarks there is a partial answer to the doubts engendered by Harvey 
and Hintikka: in some sense, in fact, every apprehension, even the most original, 
is contaminated by past acquisitions in the form of an habitual knowledge; if, 
however, we allow that a categorial moment can be contained in an intuition of an 
object, this does not imply that a categorial moment ought to have so much as a 
foundational character; according to the phenomenological framework, at any 
rate sense precedes  conceptualization: experience is first aesthetical, and then 
cultural, existential (Heidegger) and so on. 
 
6. Secondary sensuousness 
Over against the originally generative manner of givenness of the judgment, we 
have, conjoined with it, a retentional manner of givenness: wherever an original 
constitution of an objectivity of consciousness takes place, the original action (a 
judgment, a volition and so on) changes “with retentional continuity, into  a 
secondary form (eine sekundaere Form), which is no longer an activity”.19 This 
changing into a passive form is called “secondary sensuousness” (sekundaere 
Sinnlichkeit): a judgment thus, becomes a preserved acquisition (erhaltenden 
Erwerb) dependent on functionings of passivity. 
The importance of the preserved acquisitions is such that, without them, judgment 
processes, intended as “a living further-forming and connecting of meant 
categorialia to make the unity of continually new judgments at higher and higher 
levels”20 would not be possible. 
The judgment formation is a complicated many-membered (vielgliedrig) 
formation which, at the end of the process, doesn’t include in its originality any of 
the originally generated products belonging to its various levels and members. 
In paragraph 5 of Ideas II, Husserl, taking into consideration the interweavings 
holding among the different consciousness acts, states that it is more easy to see 
these multiform phenomenons than to designate it.  
The error, in my opinion, committed by Harvey and Hintikka is that of 
oversimplifying  the way judgments arise in consciousness and, in doing so, they 
would omit the right phenomenological descriptions, filling in these with notions 
which, in some sense, crystallize and reify the life of consciousness. For instance, 
20 
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they search for clarity in their phenomenological analysis where we could expect, 
say, “blurred matters of fact” (verworrenen Zustaendlichkeiten).21 
 The mistake of reification made by Harvey and Hintikka in their attempt to 
“translate” phenomenology into possible worlds semantics is not accidental, for  
modalization, which characterizes the life of consciousness, depending on the 
occurring evidences,  is transformed into a logical modeling of the noemata, so 
that, for example, the intentionality of consciousness is not due to its being-
directed-toward, but rather to its informational nature: the meaning, for example, 
of a logical disjunction like “S1  v S2” , from an analytical point of view, is not 
intended in the sense of a bifurcation of beliefs, but instead in terms of a set of 
models (possible worlds) in which S1  and S2 are true. 
The limit of such approach is that while it satisfies the aims of different 
intensional logics, it however shows signs of cracks by trying to adequate its 
fundamentally extensional method to phenomenological instances. 
Mohanty explains his ideas as follows: 
 
As long as our interest is simply providing semantics for various sorts of intensional logics, the 
lack of a genuine concept of sense does not matter. But for purposes of a phenomenology which is 
to provide descriptive structures of acts of consciousness, including the so-called propositional 
attitudes, the extensional function is far too inadequate.22 
 
All in all, Hintikka himself recognizes some difficulties concerning his attempt to 
reconcile possible worlds semantics with phenomenology, for some locutions 
such as “possible worlds” appear very unreal if applied to the phenomenological 
domain: 
 
It would be more natural to speak of different possibilities concerning our ‘actual’ world than to 
speak  of several possible worlds. For the purpose of logical and semantical analysis, the second 
locution is much more appropriate than the first, however, although I admit that it sounds 
somewhat weird and perhaps suggests that we are dealing with something much more unfamiliar 
and unrealistic than we are actually doing.23  
 
Analysis carried on by possible world semantics then doesn’t account for a valid 
justification of the link between subject and world and it cannot also provide for a 
21 
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justification of the continuity subsisting between the perceptual and the cognitive 
levels; this is a kind of critique, for example, exerted by Cobb-Stevens: 
 
1) The analytic project cannot be carried through, for logical analysis cannot establish any 
connection between words and world; 
2) by contrast the phenomenological project of exploring the continuity between predication and 
perception makes for a coherent account of the objectivity of our knowledge…24  
 
An approach as that adopted by Harvey and Hintikka has also the disadvantage of 
not discriminating enough between different contexts and different uses of e.g. the 
term “world” which, on its turn, may have very different meanings: from that of 
the formalized world of logic to that of the world in which we really live up to the 
metaphysical world of reason; only a phenomenological analysis, more 
particularly a transcendental logic,  can resolve the problems and paradoxes 
resulting from the lacking of the discrimination between these different meanings. 
Thomas Seebohm points out: 
 
Thus the paradoxes which are connected with the attempts to connect the different concepts of 
‘world’ vanish. Quite another problem occurs which is a result of the separation. How can the 
explication of modal operators and other operators- as well as some intensional relations by means 
of this abstract apparatus- have objective validity for the explication of some categorical forms 
used in ordinary talk about the real world in which we live. Here we have a question about 
‘objective validity’ which belongs to transcendental logic.25 
 
7. “Kenntnis” and “Erkenntnis” 
Another mistake, in my opinion, made by Hintikka and Harvey consists of leaving 
out the important phenomenological difference between “Kenntnis” and 
“Erkenntnis”: even if “Kenntnis” is objectively directed, it is not yet “Erkenntnis” 
in the sense of predicative knowledge; Husserl distinguishes between “Vorformen 
der Erkenntnis” and “Vollformen der Erkenntnis”, so that  omitting this 
difference, we would have already at the prepredicative level all the conceptual 
determinations of  the categorial level. 
We ought to separate then prepredicative experience (Kenntnis) from knowledge 
(Erkenntnis) on the basis of the following aspects: 
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1) der modus of “availability” (Verfuegbarkeit) which can be splitted into 
“habitual acquisition” (habitueller Besitz) and “available acquisition” 
(verfuegbarer Besitz); 
2) the different interests presented respectively in the prepredicative and the 
predicative levels; 
3) the different objects contained in these two levels of activity; 
4) the different degrees (Stufen) of activity performed by the two levels; 
5) the importance of the notion of “mediation” (Mittelbarkeit) intended as a 
watershed between precategorial and categorial life of consciousness. 
The aspects which distinguish the prepredicative experience from knowledge are 
presented by Dieter Lohmar in his essay Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. 
Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative 
Erkenntnis26 with the following words: 
 
Wir werden in der Folge sehen, dass sich vorpraedikative Erfahrung und Erkenntnis (1) in der 
Hinsicht auf den Modus der Verfuegbarkeit (habitueller Besitz-verfuegbarer Besitz), (2) im 
Hinblick auf das in den jeweilign Akten lebendige Interesse, (3) durch ihren Gegestand, (4) durch 
die Stufe der Aktivitaet in den notwendigen Konstitutionsschritten und (5) durch ihre gegebene 
oder nicht gegebene Mitteilbarkeit.27  
 
As regards (1), we may add that habitual knowledge (in the sense of “Kenntnis”) 
is certainly a lasting acquisition, but not something that is available (verfuegbar) 
to us every time; on the contrary, an acquisition of the predicative sphere is 
available for ever: the judgment here holds for ever because, at the basis of a 
lasting available acquisition, there is a modification of the will: here “still holding” 
means “still willing”. 
This intervention of the will is what discriminates the interest which pervades the 
prepredicative level from that present in the categorial level: in the predicative 
sphere in fact there is a willing participation of the Ego at play: all determinations 
of the objects of consciousness are maintained (festgehalten) for ever (ein fuer 
allemal), that is, holding for all the subjects: 
 
We return to what is reproduced as to an acquisition, actively produced in an act of will oriented 
toward this acquisition. As such, it is intentionally characterized. It is reproduced otherwise than in 
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a mere memory: a modification of the will is present, as with every acquisition (Erwerb). This 
gives it the character, not only of something which has been voluntarily apprehended earlier, but of 
an acquisition which still continues to be valid, which we still hold in our will, not now simply 
repeating the act of will, but willing in the form of reproduction, which is that of the ‘still’: I, 
present ego, as belonging to the particular mode of the present, am still willing…Thus cognition as 
action is an activity with an aim, an activity directed toward the possessive apprehension of true 
being and being-such of an object, its determinative characteristics, in the corresponding states of 
affairs.28  
 
In the predicative dimension of consciousness therefore to judge is a question of 
decision-making, that is, of appropriation “through which the active, strivingly 
active Ego appropriates to itself an acquisition, that is, an abiding knowledge”.29 
According to Husserl thus the abiding validity of a categorical acquisition is an 
“active acceptance”, a “declaring-something-as-valid”. 
 
When I posit something as valid in an affirmative and judicative manner, I mean by this that it is 
settled for me from now on, as established for the future, and in particular, as being in this way or 
that. If we were to stand already within the sphere of expressive, predicative judging and in the 
sphere of communication, then the accomplishment of judgment would be articulated most acutely 
with the phrase, “I ascertain,” or also “I assert that.” But we must observe- and this belongs to the 
essence of judgment- that we do not already find the communicative relation in judgment’s first 
originality; as a rule the communicative relation is presented along with the expression, the 
assertion.30 
 
As regards (5), we note that the availibility of the predicative acquisition is 
accomplished in the dimension of language: objective knowledge otherwise than 
prepredicative experience is possible only if the apprehended is communicated 
(mitgeteilt); the fixation of the meaning of a judgment in a verbal expression 
(Ausdruck) gives it an holding intersubjective validity. 
The linguistic expression of predicative acquisitions, even if it occurs through 
“indications” at first empty, can lead to envisionment by presentification or by 
renewed self-giving of the identical. 
In Husserl’s point of view, in the predicative sphere are constituted new kinds of 
objects which can be made thematic as logical structures  and are called categorial 
objectivities or objectivities of the understanding.31 
24 
Giorgio Rizzo 
 
Thus, cognition, as a higher activity, can be seen, in contrast to receptivity, as 
“creative spontaneity” (erzeugende Spontaneitaet), in itself productive of objects; 
this, however, does not amount to recognize the cognition of the power of 
producing freely, without constraints, categorial objects. We might  distinguish, as 
a matter of fact, between “herstellen” and “erzeugen” which are different 
activities of production: the “erzeugen” of the creative spontaneity has nothing to 
do with  the “herstellen” by virtue of which we, as for a blacksmith, predelineate 
the result of the productive operation, projecting willingly into the future the 
determinations of the object we want to  make. 
At this point of the analysis, a term like “creative” means rather “a production of 
the knowledge of a self-given object”; what is in question here is, as it were, the 
realization of a tendency toward self-givenness; the ego lives in the activity of 
objectivation, even if “the striving of cognition, however, has its analogies with 
desirous striving”.  
This position concerning the meaning of the expression “creative spontaneity” is 
also shared by Dieter Lohmar who states: 
 
Diese ‘Erzeugung’ ist aber nicht als ein ‘Herstellen’ zu verstehen, bei dem wir das Ergebnis 
willentlich projektieren oder sogar erzwingen koennten. Es handelt sich auch nicht- wie der 
Kontext nahelegen koennte- um eine freie Schoepfung (‘Erzeugen’) von 
Verstandesgegenstaendlichkeiten selbst, sondern um ‘eine Erzeugung der Erkenntnis von einem 
selbstgegeben Gegenstand’.32 
 
Prepredicative experience and predicative formations are, in the point of view of a 
genetic analysis, different, for they perform different genetic steps; this does not 
mean that they de facto are separate from each other: 
 
…this distinction of levels should not be construed as if the different operations were somehow 
separate from each other. On the contrary, things which must be treated separately for the sake of 
analysis and which, genetically, are recognized as belonging to different levels of objectification 
are as a rule actually closely entwined.33 
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What does the term “entwined” properly means’? Does the use of this term bring 
Husserl’s idea about the prepredicative and the predicative formations nearer to 
that of Harvey and Hintikka based on the notion of “reverse constitution”?  
Regarding this question, Husserl has a clear opinion: it is certainly true that it is 
not always necessary first to run through a chain of receptive experiences before 
there could be an awakening of a categorial activity; we can, from the first, 
thematize a pregiven object only in the interest of cognition: in this case, 
predicative forming goes hand in hand with receptive apprehension; but all this 
does not mean that the foundation relation can be inverted:  
 
Each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only 
that can be originally predicated which has been originallly given in an intuition, apprehended, and 
explicated34. 
 
8. Practical vs. theoretical 
The  view shared by Hintikka and Harvey, in my opinion, lays two important 
theoretical deficiencies before us: the first, particular, concerning with  possible 
world semantics, the second, on the other hand, more general, involving the sense 
of the phenomenological enterprise.  
According to Harvey and Hintikka, there would be, prima facie, a “philosophical 
discontinuity” between phenomenology and possible worlds semantics: for 
instance, the meaning of a disjunction (S1 v S2), in possible worlds semantics, is 
not explicated in terms of a bifurcation of beliefs, but in terms of the theoretical 
sets of models (possible worlds) in which S1 and S2 respectively are true: 
 
What has taken place in the systematic logical theory of our century is not a modalization in 
Husserl's sense, but a modalization.35 
 
Notwithstanding this dissimilarity, they however argue that, rightly understood, 
the two approaches “complement” rather than contradict each other: they, as a 
matter of fact,  would approach the same subject-matter even if from different 
directions. It is nevertheless a hard task to see how the two approaches would 
complement each other and in which sense they would concern the same 
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argument: passivity (modalization) and activity (modalities) involve an analysis of 
different consciousness fields which cannot anyway run in parallel; they entail, as 
a matter of fact, different forms of temporalization and apply to different kinds of 
objects (or “quasi-objects” in case of prepredicative apprehensions). For instance, 
for the substantivation in which the state of affairs is educed from a judgment 
“there is nothing analogous at the lower level”.36 
It is certainly true that looking at possible worlds semantics from a 
phenomenological point of view has the advantage of treating worlds only as 
“motivated worlds”; for the same reason, the notion of possibility itself needs to 
be reviewed in favor of motivated possibilities, that is to say, possibilities tied to 
fundamental background beliefs which predelineate the properties of the objects 
taken into consideration. 
In contrast with Harvey's and Hintikka's view, however, it is hard to think that the 
shift from motivated possibilities to logical one is so plain as supposed by the two 
scholars. 
Possible worlds semantics would disengage the possibilities it deals with from 
their constitutive sources, operating with reified or pure possibilities; therefore, 
possible worlds semantics runs the risk of being burdened with “the naïveté of an 
ontological discourse”37. 
Moreover, in assuming that a possible worlds semantics ought to be tied to a 
“world home” with a “principle of production” lodged within that world , that is , 
by anchoring the principle of production of possibilities to a cognizing subject, it 
is very easy to make this approach unrecognizable. 
“Indexing” the key notions of possible worlds semantics with some, as it were, 
precategorial findings of the genetic phenomenology would amount, in my point 
opinion, not to a complement operation, but to the recognition of their reciprocal 
impossibility to be reconciled. 
Harvey and Hintikka take Mohanty’s remarks on a phenomenological account of 
“possibility”38 into serious consideration, but they would neglect the more 
important point of it: if we support a phenomenological point of view, we cannot 
give up an essential distinction concerning with the notion of possibility: 
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It is of importance that we elaborate in an exemplary fashion the contrast emerging here between 
possibility in the sense of merely “logical possibility”, mere possibility in the sense of merely 
“logical” possibility, mere possibility on the basis of intuitive representation, and practical 
possibility as the to be-able-to.39 
  
In Husserl’s point of view, logical and practical possibilities derive both from a 
neutrality modification: the former from a neutrality modification of intuitive 
representation, the latter from a neutrality modification of acting into a quasi-
acting40. If we accept the primal of practical over against the theoretical, then we 
can construe the empty horizons belonging to any experience as a system of 
possibilities for practical intervention; all doxic-logical possibilities can be 
reduced, at least, to the practical “I can phantasize”.41 
 
9. Husserl’s conception of history 
The  remarks made above have also some consequences on the interpretation of 
Husserl’s conception  of history; he, in fact, would not countenance the view 
according to which every historical age and every world opening represent an 
instantiation of the truth: the outcome of such a thesis would be, as a matter of 
fact,  that only inside an historical period we can decide what is true or what is not 
true. If for Heidegger, as a matter of fact, there is not an absolute truth  valid for 
everyone42, but only points of view on which we are tuned (bestimmt) by virtue of 
our historical existence (Dasein), for Husserl, on the contrary, historical world is 
not all: the idea of truth doesn’t dissolve into the variety of the historical worlds; 
the latter are therefore referred intentionally to the idea of truth, that is, to a unique 
world. 
Western culture, according to his view, results in an infinite difference between 
representation and truth; from this point of view, Husserl’s analysis of perception 
gives us not a theory of meaning, but a theory of reference.  
The world then is the transcendental condition of the appearing of the things, of 
the actions and of the meanings: every judgment, that is, every categorial 
production  is grounded on it; the conditions of asseribility (language, culture, 
norms, values and the like) presuppose the conditions of manifestability.43 
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The world, in this view, is a transcendental a priori and as such the condition of 
possibility of every categorial or predicative acquisition: 
 
The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not 
occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as 
horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking life is being awake to the 
world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and of oneself as living in the world, 
actually experiencing [erleben] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world.44 
 
If we neglect this theoretical and grounding position, we may run the risk of not 
understanding the core of phenomenology: a misunderstanding mistake  into 
which Harvey and Hintikka would fall. 
If all appears in contexts of meaningfullness, of categorial formations, not all can 
be reduced to a see culturally determined; this remark, however, does not mean 
that the constitution of the sensible field of the pregiven, the prepredicative level, 
is to be intended as an absolutely determined layer on which, in a second moment, 
we can add, without reciprocal influences, the high-order level, the categorial one: 
if this position were Husserl’s last word on the relation between the precategorial 
and the categorial level, we could not fulfill the possibility of passing from the 
world in its perceptual purity to the world in its practical (existential, aesthetical, 
historical) meaningfullness. 
In Ms. K III 6, Husserl warns against the mistake of intending the relation between 
the world of representation and the world of the practical life as a  founding 
relation which goes, in temporal succession, from the lower stock to the higher 
stock of experience: 
 
Die Vorstellungswelt, die ich als Unterschichte der praktischen Welt beschreibe, so gar nicht als 
Unterschichte in der die praktische Subjektivitaet zunaechst ausser Spiel bleibt, beschrieben 
werden kann.45 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THING AND SPACE IN HUSSERL 
 
Summary 
The phenomenological reason shows how the space and the thing conceived by 
the scientific and natural thinking are a construction upon the unitary and 
meaningful world of everyday experience; therefore the aim of this chapter is to 
analyze, from an Husserlian point of view, the most foundational layers of 
“space” and “thing” beginning from the most fundamental stratum, called by 
Husserl “phantom”, the mere res extensa, and arriving at kinaesthetic fields in 
which the apprehensional character of  the things  depends from the interplay of 
sequences of K’s (kinaesthetic circumstances) and i’s (correlative images) which 
blend into a unitary and meaningful system of experience. 
 
1. Introduction 
Thing and Space is the title of a course hold by Edmund Husserl in the Summer 
semester 1907 at the University of Goettingen; the German original was published 
posthumously in 1973 as volume XVI of Husserliana. The course began with five 
introductory lecture which were published in 1947, bearing the title The Idea of 
Phenomenology. 
The specific matters at issue in this course are “thing” and “space” which he 
analyzes under the general frame of a “critique of reason”. 
While for Kant the task of reason  amounts to constitute the scientific reality of 
thing, for Husserl instead, the thing at issue is the thing of everyday experience; 
what we need, Husserl declares, is: 
 
to clarify , from the side of experiential cognition, not only the lower levels of the experience 
which lies prior to all deduction and induction- in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in 
the usual sense- but also, and a fortiori, we would need to clarify the higher levels.1  
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In short, theoretical reason aims at showing how the things conceived by the 
scientific and natural thinking result from a construction upon the unitary and 
meaningful things of everyday experience. 
The focus of the analyses concerning thing and space is then the constitution of 
the most foundational layer of the most foundational things. 
This lower foundational stratum, called by Husserl “phantom”, is the appearance 
of a mere res extensa, that is, an extended structure filled merely with sense 
qualities and not yet with substantial properties. 
To do this job, the investigations ought to solve the riddle of transcendence, 
making the phenomenological reduction effective in order to arrive at a sphere of 
“pure phenomena”.2 
Husserl prefaces the proper analysis of the “Thing-Lectures” with a brief 
introduction in which he affirms that the matter at issue is the analysis of natural, 
pre-scientific experience which has primarily a perceptual character; in and 
through this natural attitude, we experience a world that is familiar and always 
already there: 
 
In the natural attitude of spirit, an existing world stands before our eyes, a world that extends 
infinitely in space, that now is, previously was, and in the future will be. This world consists of an 
inexhaustible abundance of things, which  now endure and now change, combine with one another 
and then again separate, exercise effects on one another and then undergo them. We ourselves fit 
into this world; just as we find the world, so we find ourselves, and we encounter ourselves in the 
midst of this world. A pre-eminent position in this world, however, is proper to us: we find 
ourselves to be centers of reference for the rest of the world; it is our environment.3 
 
Since the end of the XIX century, Husserl aims at the clarification of the scientific 
concepts by returning to the intuitive ground from which they spring; for this 
reason  Husserl retains that the analysis of the geometric space ought to be 
anticipated by the investigation of the intuitive space which constitutes the genetic 
foundation of the former. 
In Raumbuch, Husserl declares that what distinguishes geometrical concepts from 
experiential concepts is the fact that the former are obtained through a process of 
idealization; in this sense, they cannot be considered as morphological concepts 
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which are apprehended on the basis of sensible perception which is, per 
definitionem, inaccurate and vague. 
Geometrical concepts, instead can be viewed as passages to limits, ideas in a 
Kantian sense, insofar they are guided by essential processes which go beyond the 
experience. 
Notwithstanding this relevant difference between space of experience and space 
of geometry, it is undoubted, in Husserl’s view, that  geometry takes root in the 
intuition, since geometry has a content fundament. 
In a brief to Natorp, dated 15.3.1897, Husserl affirms that through mere formal 
determinations we cannot arrive at space, but only to an Euclidean variety.  
In §70 of Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Husserl points out: 
 
If we use the term ‘space’ of the familiar type of order of the world of phenomena talk of ‘spaces’ 
for which, e.g. the axiom of parallels does not hold, is naturally senseless. It is just as senseless to 
speak of differing geometries, when ‘geometry’ names the science of the space of the world of 
phenomena. But if we mean by ‘space’  the categorial form of world-space, and, correlatively, by  
geometry the categorial theoretic form of geometry in the ordinary sense, the space falls under a 
genus, which we can bound by laws, of pure, categorially determinate manifolds, in regard to 
which it is natural to speak of ‘space’ in a yet more extended sense.4  
 
In this point of view, Euclidean geometry corresponds to the most direct 
idealization of the phenomenal space: it is, as a matter of fact, as infinite, 
tridimensional, homogeneous, isotropic as the space of intuition. 
To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to underline that the processes of 
idealization, according to Husserl, don not occur “on” the ground of intuition, but 
are prepared “inside” of it  through passive synthesis by virtue of which the world 
is constituted for us: idealization does not mean construction or even abstraction. 
According to Husserl there is then a layer of experience which precedes language, 
historically determined cultures and science: 
 
Thus one can put forward by itself the problem of the manner of being of the life-world; one can 
place oneself completely  upon the ground of this straightforwardly intuited world, putting out of 
play all objective-scientific opinions and cognitions, in order  to consider generally what kind of 
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“scientific” tasks to be resolved with universal validity, arise in respect  to this world’s own 
manner of being5.  
The world of experience is not a chaotic and disorganized world, but it has an 
invariable style, a particular spatial-temporal form. 
To reach then the common layer of experience, we may begin with the leitmotiv 
represented by the constitution of the spatial thing. 
 
2.The thing in Ideas I 
In § 150 of Ideas I, Husserl considers how the region “physical thing” could serve 
as a clue for a phenomenological investigation. 
We can arrive, Husserl notes, to the region “physical thing” through the attitude of 
ideation, proceeding like the geometer in the “freedom and purity” of his 
geometrical intuition.  
He continues stating that the regional idea of the physical thing, that is, its 
identical X with its sense-contents “prescribes rules governing the multiplicities of 
appearances”.6 
In this sense, Ullrich Claesges notes, transcendence reveals itself as a noetic-
noematic structure, that is, as modus by virtue of which natural consciousness, 
through “Abschattungen”, posits the self manifesting object. 
The totality of the essence of the thing remains transcendent, falling out from the 
field of the transcendental subjectivity: 
 
Die Totalitaet des Wesens scheint in der transzendentalen Reflexion nicht einholbar. Das  Wesen 
wird zu einem X, das in unaufhebbarer Diskrepanz zu dem steht, was von ihm zur adaequaten 
Gegebenheit kommen kann.7 
 
Notwithstanding the inaccessibility of the totality of the essence “physical thing”, 
we can note, through eidetic variation, that each physical thing-appearance 
necessarily includes in itself a stratum called by Husserl “physical thing-schema”: 
 
…it is the spatial shape merely filled with “sensuous” qualities- without any determinateness of 
“substantiality” and “causality”…8 
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Adopting this way of investigating the problems concerning phenomenological 
constitution, Husserl concludes that all the troubles regarding the origin of the 
idea of space can be reduced  to the phenomenological analysis of the essence of 
all noematic and noetic phenomena in which space is intuitively presented and 
constituted as the unity of appearances; for this reason we comprehend the 
intimate link which ties thing and space in phenomenological investigations. 
Through originary experiencing consciousness we can arrive at determining the 
different levels and the strata of physical thing-constitution: 
 
Every level, and every stratum in the level, is characterized by the fact that it constitutes an own 
peculiar unity which, on its side, is a necessary middle member for the full constitution of the 
physical thing.9 
 
To begin with, we ought to consider that in pure phenomenological attitude there 
are groups of features which are not represented in the apprehension; the thing 
which appears at rest and unchanged  qualitatively shows us only its schema, so 
that it is not yet so much as a thing, that is, a thing in the usual sense as material-
real. 
It is also remarkable to note that the concept of schema (the concept of phantom) 
cannot be restricted merely to a single sense-sphere: 
 
A perceived thing also has its tactual schema, which comes to light in tactual grasping. In general, 
there are precisely as many strata there to be distinguished in the full schema as there are to be 
found classes of sensuous data which are spread over the spatial extension (appearing as 
something identical ) of the thing.10 
 
If up to now, we have taken the thing in isolation, it is time to consider that it is in 
relation to “circumstances” that the thing is what it is. 
Reality, called also “materiality”, as a matter of fact, does not lie only in the mere 
sensuous schema; there are in fact some functional connections which relate the 
schematic modifications of one aspect to those of other aspects. 
So long as the circumstances remain unchanged, the schema remains unchanged 
as well; at any rate, there is a rule according to which to similar circumstances 
belong similar functional dependencies: 
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A steel spring, once struck, executes certain oscillations and runs through certain successions of 
states of relative change of place and deformation: the spring has the real property of “elasticity”. 
As soon as a certain impetus is given, there occurs a corresponding deviation from the state of rest 
and a certain corresponding mode of oscillation.11 
 
The apperception of real properties include, as a matter of fact, not only the 
articulation in circumstances but also the functionally dependent changes of the 
schemata in such a way that this dependency holds in any given case. 
By virtue of a “realizing apprehension”, that is, of a kind of apprehension which 
constitutes the real thing as substrate of real properties, the schema or phantom 
acquires the character of a real determinateness: 
 
Over against the real unitary property, in our example the unchanged Objective color, there stands 
the momentary real state, which corresponds to the “circumstances” and which changes according 
to rules. The state coincides with the schema; yet it is not a mere schema (the thing is indeed not a 
mere phantom).12 
 
The thing-apprehension then considers the schema not exclusively as an extension 
filled merely sensuously but also as primal manifestation or “documentation” of 
real and causal properties; causal dependencies, according to Husserl, come to 
originary giveness, that is, they are not merely supposed, but also seen or 
perceived. 
Thus is possible to have various grasping of the thing, even if it is the identical 
substrate of states related to different circumstances: 
There are as many directions of unity prefigured in the causal apprehension of the 
schema (i.e., directions for possible series or perceptions in functional relation to 
series of perceptible circumstances) as there is multiplicity in the way in which 
the reality-thing, the unitary material “substance”, is determinable according to 
properties corresponding to the apprehended sense itself.13 
 
3. Systematic constitution of space 
Each body is constituted, according to Husserl, in an orientation and this means 
that each body is given to intuition in a kind of “quality”, in a location which has 
its dimensional modifications. 
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A body, as it is discussed above, is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense 
of sight and  touch, but this is not the end of the story: every sense in fact is a 
sense only “through an apperceptive conjunction of the corresponding sense-data 
with kinaesthetic data”.14 
The kinaesthetic field is, in Husserls’ point of view, a field of continuous data; a 
kinaesthetic field is variable immediately and freely.  
The kinaesthetic field is introduced by Husserl for the purpose of penetrating as 
deeply as possible into the phenomenological constitution of the three 
dimensional spatiality: all spatiality, as a matter of fact, comes to givennes  in 
movement, that is, in the movement of the object itself and in the movement of 
the Ego. It is, as a matter of fact, a phenomenological law of constitution that the 
unity of the object demonstrates itself only in the unity of synthesis continually 
joining the manifold of perceptions: 
 
In our case, it means that an identical and unchanged spatial body demonstrates itself as such only 
in kinetic series of perceptions, which continually brings to appearance the various sides of that 
thing.15 
 
Visual contents are not sufficient in themselves to serve as apprehensional 
contents for visual spatiality and for a thing in general even if only visual and 
tactile contents have the peculiarity of coalescing into fields, capable as they are 
of bringing a thing to presentation; classes of sensation that have no fields are 
therefore incapable of a projective presentation: 
 
I am naturally thinking here of the sensations of movement. They play an essential role in the 
apprehension of every external thing, but they are not themselves apprehended in such a way that 
they make representable either a proper or an improper matter; they do not belong to the 
“projection” of the thing. Nothing qualitative corresponds to them in the thing, nor they adumbrate 
bodies or present them by way of projection. And yet without their cooperation there is no body 
there, no thing.16 
 
However, according to Husserl, the incapability of the sensations of movement to 
present any matter does not apply to the Ego-Body into which these sensations are 
inserted as appearances. If, as a matter of fact, the Body is also a thing, a physical 
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thing like any other, on the other hand it is the bearer of the Ego: which has 
sensations that are localized in the Body. 
The touching hand “appears” as having touch sensations. If we turn to the touched Object, 
smoothness and roughness appear as belonging to it. But if I attend to the touching hand, then it 
possesses the sensation of smoothness and the sensation of roughness, and it possesses them on or 
in the appearing finger tips. Likewise, the sensations of location and of movement, which have 
their Objectivating function, are attributed immediately to the hand and to the arm, as encased in 
them.17 
 
4. The correlation between the visual field and the kinaesthetic sequences 
Every field is, according to Husserl, a fixed system of locations and this means 
that every element of sensation has its corresponding location, its “here”; more 
particularly, the visual field is a two-dimensional manifold which is in itself 
congruent, continuous, utterly coherent, finite and bounded. 
All the terms that are appropriate to the visual field, such as line, point, location, 
shape cannot be, in Husserl’s point of view, understood in the spatial sense: 
 
We already said earlier that the visual field is not some sort of surface in Objective space, which 
makes no sense, any more than points and lines in the visual field are points and lines in Objective 
space or even have any spatial relation whatsoever to spatial points and lines.18 
 
A concretum in the field can change “quasi-materially” (“quasi” means here that 
the parameters involved are not empirically objective, but phenomenological law-
like) according to variables like quality, brilliance, saturation and so on; it can 
also change in size, shape or location by virtue of kinaesthetic sequences.  
Kinaesthetic sensations lack an essential relation to the visual sensations, “they 
are connected to them functionally but not essentially”;19 kinaesthetic sensations 
form continuous multidimensional systems in which continuous unities appear 
only as sequences, that is, by filling a span of time. 
For instance, we assume that a kinaesthetic ocular sensation K1 is at first constant, 
the thing remaining stationary too,  during the stream of time t0-t1; in this 
streaming time then the visual image i1 remains also constant. If then K1 changes, 
in a continuous sequence, into K2, then the image i1, during the new span of time, 
changes also into i2. 
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If K2 reverts back to K1, then also i2 changes into i1 in the same time span: 
 
In every appearance of a stationary thing, these two factors or sensation are involved, the K-factor 
and the i-factor. Their relation is one of dependence, as we have just attempted to determine. And 
the dependence is reciprocal. The same K-sensation is accompanied by the same image, and the 
same image also by the same K-sensation.20     
 
To a complex of K’s and i’s is attached an apprehensional character which refers 
to the possible sequences of i in the total system under the possible kinaesthetic 
circumstances; ideal possibilities of fulfillment then arise in the elapsing of such 
system: 
 
In every such nexus of fulfillment, the images are subtended by the consciousness of unity, which 
is and remains the same, where the appurtenant appearances are fulfilled, under the relevant 
kinaesthetic circumstances, in the sense of the general type.21   
 
The consciousness of unity constitutes the one identical thing as is presented 
identically through the images and under the relevant circumstances; the 
continuity of images is a linear manifold “extracted out” of a multidimensional 
manifold of possible images which are linked to K’s through the unity of the 
continuity of apprehension: the latter unites the K’s and the i’s belonging to every 
temporal phase into an apprehensional unity. 
According to Husserl, there are two important and essential components 
belonging to the temporal elapsing of each apprehensional phase: the i-component 
and the K-component. 
 
The former supplies the “intention toward,” the latter the motivation of this intention. The 
“intention toward” is differentiated and directed  in such and such a way under these circumstances 
K. More precisely, the stream of the K’s or, to be exact, the stream of these K’s, determines by 
way of motivation the type and form of the “intention toward” in its elapsing. Every phase of the i-
component is an “intention toward” in such a way that it penetrates the next phase, i.e., penetrates 
its image, by referring to it and referring trough it: here the i-component fulfills itself, but it again 
penetrates the next phase and again is fulfilled, etc., such that every I is both fulfillment and 
fulfilling and is so natural by means  of  its apprehensional function.22  
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The system of K’s becomes more complex when we expand the system of 
movements: besides the elapsing of kinaesthetic sensations of the eye, designated 
above as K, there might elapse kinaesthetic sensations pertaining to the head, the 
trunk and so on. In this respect, we are provided, as it were, with a complex of 
variables (K, K’, K’’,…)that, as Husserl notes, are independently variable in 
relation to one another but in such a way that they form a system where each of 
the variables has a definite value: 
 
Nevertheless, since the change in the images, i.e., the character of the delimitation and fulfillment 
of the visual field, is not merely dependent on the individual K-variables, but also on the manifold 
system (K, K’, K’’, …), and since the variation of the K’s ( a name for the “K’, K’’, K’’, …), in 
the case of the constancy of K, determines new occurrences and manifolds of images of a new 
type, the intentional system from the very outset is therefore a complicated one.23 
 
5.The constitution of space: the stationary thing 
Let us start from an absolutely stationary world of things, a world, as it were, 
which lacks qualitative or phoronomic changes of its Objects; qualitative 
discontinuity is what gives the oculomotor image separate existence: the figure or 
object is distinguished by the fact that its coloration does not blend into that of the 
surroundings. Change in orientation and in expansion, in the continuity of the 
oculomotor fields, creates unities of appurtenance and contains principles of 
conjunction; notwithstanding such changes, an identity penetrates every constant 
modification so that “every part which has arisen as continuous out of one part of 
the original image presents the same image”.24 
The same holds for the concealment: if an image constantly obliterates another 
image then, according to a rule, the image that is not yet obliterated remains a 
presentation of the same thing; when nevertheless the movement is reversed the 
Object is continuously built back up: 
 
This constant demolition and rebuilding due to such a concealing Object is a system of 
modifications which is strictly motivated by the kinaesthetic circumstances.25 
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When an Object is constantly concealed, its full intentions, as a matter of fact, 
become empty , even if they do not lack the character of perceptual intentions, 
motivated in the motivational nexus. 
Let us now proceed to the class of modifications included under the term 
“expansion”; it can apply unitarily to the whole field or to different pieces of the 
same. 
It holds, according to a phenomenological law, that what pertains to the unity of a 
continuous expansion also pertains to the unity of a presentation; admittedly, it is 
possible that different types of expansion can indeed be joined into the unity of an 
object: 
 
Think, for instance, of the case of two mutually bounded surfaces. Let us take simultaneously 
visible and mutually bounded surfaces of a polyhedron which present themselves in different 
expansional modifications. Yet the two series of modifications belong together; they pertain to the 
same kinaesthetic circumstances, they stream on together, and they form in this unitary stream a 
determinate type of unitary modification.26 
 
Expansion moreover can be mixed with concealment as in the case of an 
undulating surface which undergoes kinaesthetic change. 
Under the heading of the modification of turning, we require that concealment 
and unconcealment are in play in a way different from that in which the 
acquisition and loss of presentational content have their source in the entering and 
exiting of parts of images into or out of the oculomotor field. 
Husserl distinguishes between “pure receding” which is a linear modification, that 
is, a kinaesthetic system in which the motivating circumstances vary infinitely in a 
linearly orthoid manner form, and “pure turning” that is a cyclical modification 
where the kinaesthetic circumstances vary cyclically, bringing back the turning 
series of images. 
When an object undergoes a modification of remoteness, the image contracts in 
infinitum, having the “null-point” as the limit; in the reverse direction, we 
encounter the infinite enlargement of the image: in these cases the appearing side 
is ever the same; the other sides, as it were, appear through the possible 
modifications of turning. 
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Husserl remarks that mere expansion is a modification that is not related to mere 
change in orientation, because the latter is the displacement or rotation of a figure 
that maintains its identity in the oculomotor field: 
 
 
As regards expansion, on the other hand, the points do not retain their reciprocal orientation. The 
concept of expansion implies in the first place, generally speaking, a change in the location of the 
points in the field. Where all the points maintain their location, we can naturally not speak of a 
modification.27 
 
Turning, as distinct from expansion, constantly brings new presentational contents 
so that to say “the object is turning” means the same as saying that it constantly 
shoes itself from new sides; when a complete revolution is carried out, the 
sequential appearance of sides brings to appearance the closedness of the nexus of 
sides and therefore, gets the complete corporeal surface to appear as a closed one. 
Expansional modification lacks, as mere receding and approaching, the cyclical 
character; it has the character of “bilaterality”  where “bilateral” means that it has 
two and only two directions which fuse as opposites into a linear manifold. 
 
6.Qualitative and phoronomic change of the thing 
In the preceding remarks we have started from the assumption that the world of 
things is absolutely stationary, stationary not only in the phoronomic sense, but 
also in the qualitative one. We can consider now the changeableness of qualities, 
e.g. coloration, of the things; everything has its pre-empirical form (size for 
example) and its pre-empirical qualities (color, for example) as filling the form in 
all its parts: both these components can undergo their changes, thus constituting 
the objective form filled throughout with objective qualities. 
Coloration, Husserl adds, is, on one side, variable independently of the form, but, 
on the other side, it is inseparable from the form because it reveals itself as the 
condition of possibility of the concrete form, that is, a condition of possibility for 
the constitution of corporeality.  
As to the question of how is the thing constituted as identical in qualitative 
change, we can state that the thing is what is unitary when the qualities change 
41 
Philosophical exercises. Inquiries into phenomenology and philosophy of language 
 
and the form remains identical: the thing is a multidimensional infinite manifold of 
image-modifications which becomes the bearer of the consciousness of unity; 
when, i.e., the coloration changes unexpectedly, then the actual perception 
experiences a leap by virtue of which it no longer elapses in  the sense of the 
original apprehension. In this way, the apprehension disappoints the intention 
instead of fulfilling it so that the consciousness has the form of the “otherwise”. 
When the coloration changes continuously, kinaesthesias can be absolutely 
stationary for a certain period of time: in this case, the image endures unchanged 
with regard to pre-empirical form and location, even if the coloration changes. 
Passing over to the complete system of kinaesthetic motivations, the image is 
absorbed into the infinities of possible modifications pertaining to the kinaesthetic 
systems of the Body: 
 
In the system of absolute non-change, there pertains to every kinaesthetic situation, to every 
determinate Bodily position (once the coordination is carried out through a first perception), a 
strictly determinate appearance according to color as well as form, and to every kinaesthetic series, 
to every determinate change in position, there pertains a determinate series of appearances.28 
 
A second basic type of change is movement, first of all, movement without 
qualitative change, thus mere movement. 
What characterizes movement is the fact that the object occupies different 
locations, thus undergoing a change, even if it remains the same: sameness here 
means that two co-existing things are completely the same, except for their 
location, if each of them is constituted in the same manifold of appearances. Their 
difference can reside only in the kinaesthetic relations, in their relations to other 
things; in this case, the continuous change does not affect the kinaesthetic 
coordination: 
 
For instance, if I keep my body stationary, perhaps while sitting, and even keep my eyes still, then, 
at the beginning of the course of movement of the thing, the image α pertains to this bodily 
posture, thus to the determinate K-complex. Now the thing moves. If we extract a phase of the 
movement, it offers a different image, β as pertaining to the same K (I am still sitting) but to a 
different time. Thereby, however, this β-image also already pertains to the thing in its initial 
location, prior to the movement. But in order to reach this image, I must assume a different bodily 
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posture: K’. Due to the movement of the thing, however, β is now connected to K instead of K’. 
Likewise, α also pertains to the thing in its new location, but α is not coordinated to K but to a 
different K, let us say K’’.29  
 
 
7. The importance of the Body for Husserl 
According to Husserl, the importance of  the Body, intended as lived body, is not 
only due to the fact that it is the basis of the constitution of the three-dimensional 
space, but also to the more massive fact that everything that appears belongs to its  
(the lived body’s) environs; thanks to the Body I am at the center of things and, 
for this reason, the “I-myself” is a bodily self, as it were, the “I-center” of all my 
experiences. 
My Body then can be conceived as a “null-body” (Nullkoerper) thanks to which 
everything in my immediate surrounding is given a location. 
My Body, as the zero point in analytical geometry, has the property of seeming 
always to be unmoving in relation to the surrounding world; it moreover presents 
fundamental anomalies which distinguish it from all other things: 
 
In popular terms, every thing in the whole world can escape from me, except for my own Body… 
the manifold of images that pertains to the Body has a distinctive kinaesthetic motivation in 
contrast to other things.30 
 
For instance, when we walk we do not experience only a movement of the legs in 
relation to the other parts of the Body, but also a movement of the entire visible 
Body through a change in its distance from other bodies; the Ego-point does not 
recede, it is always co-moved: 
 
 The Body moves, but does so without “receding” from itself: the images of it do not change in the 
sense of  “receding”. In this way, therefore, the Ego moves.31 
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The Body thus is stationary to itself so that the true stabilitas loci is not to be 
found in God or in the enduring landmarks, but in myself. 
According to Edward Casey, Kant was right to think that the Body is the source of 
orientation, but he did not show that it is such a source only inasmuch it is the 
stable center of the perceptual field.32 
Husserl posits between the lived body and the objective space a Sehraum, a purely 
visual space, in order to make the objective space a lived space: the visual space 
has its own system of places (Ortssystem) even if the notion of “place” here is 
conceived mainly as simple location; this last assumption would be demonstrated 
by the fact that Husserl uses Ort (place) and Lage (position) interchangeable.33 
Anyway, it seems that Husserl introduces a new conception of place: as a matter 
of fact, the kinesthetic motivations make of the invariably given manifold of 
places something which is never given without a K (e.g. a kinaesthetic sensation). 
The feeling of my own body being or moving in a place affects the way I 
experience that place. 
Casey writes: 
 
And if kinesthetic self-awareness is itself the basic form that awareness of my body takes (whether 
this corporeal consciousness be visual or tactile), then  it will constitute a privileged entry into 
place as I actually experience it. Feeling my body means feeling how it is to occupy the place it is 
in.34 
 
Kinesthetic self-awareness has the character of spontaneity (Spontaneitaet) and 
this means that its domain is a system of kinaesthetic situations; this character has 
the form of a “von-mir-aus-Geschehen”35, as it were, of an occurring thanks to 
me. Such a system, determined as spontaneity of the kinaesthetic consciousness, 
actualizes practical possibilities (Vermoeglichkeiten) and, for this reason, it has 
the character of movement (Bewegung). 
It is also plausible, on the ground of phenomenological analyses, to suppose that 
receptivity (Rezeptivitaet), that is, the givenness of appearances in an objective 
apprehension, would depend on kinaesthetic situations so that even the passive 
layer of consciousness would be founded on the active layer of the same36; the 
link and interaction between receptivity and spontaneity can be achieved by the 
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consciousness of the Body which functions as a structural regulative system 
(Regelstruktur). 
Claesges states as: 
 
Durch den Leib (als Moment des kinaesthetischen Bewusstseins) wird die Rezeptivitaet so 
geregelt, dass sie nur als Empfindung moeglich ist, d.h. zugleich immer auch als ein Vorkommnis 
an einer in Raum und Zeit erscheineden Gegenstaendlichkeit aufgefasst warden kann.37 
 
The foundational correlation between receptivity and spontaneity would depend 
ultimately on the uniqueness of the Body : it, as a matter of fact, comes ahead of 
every constitution of spatial-temporal objects, even ahead of that constitution 
thanks to which it appears as res extensa. The Body is not primarily an object, it is 
much more a structural totality (Strukturganzheit) that belongs to the a priori of 
the perceptual and kinaesthetic consciousness. 
The Body, in contrast with other objects, is constituted by the “reflection” 
(Reflexivitaet) of the tactile system; insofar as it is subject to the availableness 
(Verfuegbarkeit) of the Ego, the Body reveals itself as an Ego opposed to the 
outer world: 
 
Dadurch ergibt sich ein doppeltes Verhaeltnis des Ich zu seinem Leibe. Einmal muss sich das Ich 
mit seinem Leibe identifizieren koennen, den sonst waere nicht einsichtig, wieso das Ich selber in 
der Welt sein koennte; zum anderen muss sich das Ich von seinem Leib unterscheiden koennen, 
denn der Leib ist eine kinaestetisch konstituierte Gegenstaendlichkeit, die als solche ein Ich der 
kinaesthetischen Vermoeglichkeiten voraussetzt.38  
 
Husserl seems to lack an articulated concept of lived space, even if he resorts to 
various substitutes of the same: think not only of the notion of “concrete 
appearance” (Apparenz), but also, and above all, of that of the “the near-sphere” 
(Nahsphaere): 
 
Thanks to my kinesthesias, I have access to a near-sphere that is a major part of my “core-world” 
(Kernwelt). In and through- and around- this circle of nearness, places are constellated as nearby 
areas in/to which I can move. The near-sphere includes the approachability implied in the “I can”  
of kinaesthetic awareness. My own near-sphere is in effect the proximal place or places in which I 
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am or to which I can go (my far-sphere, in contrast, contains places to which I do not have 
immediate access.39 
 
The near-sphere not only fills the gap between body and place, but it is relevant 
also for the constitution of space since this does not arise from pure intuition but 
from concrete things to which we have access; “nearness” can be defined as what 
I can see in a small stretch of time, in a unitary comprehensive intuition and in a 
kinesthetic aspect relative to a unified consciousness.40  
The Husserlian notion of “nearness”, even if more theoretical, can be drawn near 
to the Heideggerian “closeness” which, however, presents an existential turn; 
Heidegger thinks of the human implacement in terms of “The Aroundness of the 
Environment and Dasein’s spatiality”: “closeness” represents, in his point of view, 
the most salient characteristic of the spatiality of the ready-to-hand in its 
familiarity: 
 
Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring 
distances. This closeness regulates itself in terms of circumspectively ‘calculative’ manipulating 
and using… When this closeness of the equipment has been given directionality, this signifies no 
merely that the equipment has its position (Stelle) in space as present-at-hand somewhere, but also 
that as equipment it has been essentially fitted up and installed, set up, and put to rights.41 
 
The richness here of the notion of “closeness”, associated as it is with terms such 
as “familiarity”, “calculative manipulating” or “equipment”, marks its distance 
from the Husserlian concept of “nearness” which gets rid of the existential 
concreteness of the Heideggerian “closeness”. 
The notion of “closeness” or that of “nearness” assume an even more important 
role in Heidegger’s very late writings: this relevance is indicated by the verbal 
proliferation of terms like the active gerund “naehernd” or noun forms like 
“nearhood” (Nahheit) and “nighness” (Nahnis). Thanks to nearness, the Open is 
nor enclosed from without neither gathered as a region or located as a thing: it 
points much more to a neighborhood, that is, to the nearness of things and people 
who coinhabit a place in common.42 
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It remains now to answer the question of what, in Husserl’s point of view, makes 
possible the passage from the near-sphere to the objective space. 
Spatiality, that is, objective space, is constituted through the concatenation of 
places available to me in my near-sphere; according to Casey, what we call 
“space” is not just the correlate, as it is for Claesges, of my kinesthetically felt 
near-sphere but its very expansion. In Husserl’s point of view, the apperceptive 
expansion (Erweiterung) of the near-sphere is achieved in a homogeneous infinite 
open world of space: 
 
This amounts to saying that the emptying and amalgamation of particular spaces, each of which is 
felt kinesthetically by the lived body, becomes in short order the planiform, absolute space of 
Newton. But that is possible only to the extent that places themselves depend on the lived body as 
the I-center or null-point, the “absolute here”, of any given perceptual field.43 
 
The lived body, according to Husserl, is not itself in space as a physical object 
exists in space; it moves through space as “indirectly co-localized” in its 
movements: 
 
My body- in particular, say, the bodily part “hand”-moves in space; [but] the activity of holding 
sway, “kinesthesis”, which is embodied together with the body’s movement, is not itself in space 
as a spatial movement but is only indirectly co-localized in that movement.44 
 
Only by virtue of this original experience of the bodily holding-sway, I am able to 
understand another physical body as a living body in which another “I” is 
embodied and holds sway. 
If we believe that only natural sciences would capture the true nature of things, 
then, as a matter of fact, we are compelled to think that the Lebenswelt is merely 
subjective and relative, treating the world as if it could exist independently of any 
human accomplishment; Husserl opposes this view; it is because it does not 
justice  to the very subjectivity which accomplishes science. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILFRID SELLARS 
 
Summary 
According to Richard Rorty, Sellars’ philosophical enterprise has the merit of 
challenging the Kantian foundation of knowledge, since it aims at undermining 
the whole framework of givenness by adopting a form of holism founded on the 
idea that justification is not a matter of a special relation  between ideas and 
objects, but of conversation, of social practice. In this sense, philosophy cannot 
no way maintain the role of a metapractice intended to criticize all the possible 
forms of social interplays; it searches no more for  certainty. The behaviorist 
attitude is not a matter of “adequacy” since it aims at  rejecting all those sorts of 
explanations founded on the reliability and authority  of first-person reports about 
the world or the mind; more than this the issue of behaviorism is to inquire 
whether a practice of justification can be given a grounding in a fact. 
Sellars’ project can be seen as Kantian since he believes that the conceptual 
frameworks by virtue of which we encounter the world contain some synthetic a 
priori truths and are not deprived of a prescriptive or normative dimension. 
According to Sellars, to be a good philosopher is to cope with the dialectical 
character of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the 
current conceptual framework. The courage to threaten well-accepted frameworks 
is demonstrated by Sellars through the demolition of the myth of the Given, that is, 
through the rejection of the idea that there would be an exogenous Given imposed 
from the outside on our system of beliefs.  
Sellars’ efforts are directed toward the development of a sort of “principle of 
comprehension” according to which nothing in the phenomenal field must be 
completely repudiated since even the scientific discourse is but a continuation and 
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refinement of the common sense framework; in this sense, Sellars’ thought can be 
characterized as naturalistic even if not reductionist. 
 
1. Rorty reads Sellars 
According to Richard Rorty, philosophy since Descartes, has been dominated by 
epistemology; few philosophers took seriously the effort to stigmatize radically 
the notion of philosophy as metacriticism of special disciplines, proclaiming  the 
unreality of the traditional epistemological problems and solutions. 
“The spirit of playfulness” which connotes the philosophical enterprise at the 
beginning of the 1900, turned very early to a more serious way of doing 
philosophy, inspired by the force of the mathematical logic: Husserl and Russell 
are in this sense paradigmatic figures. 
The discovery of “privileged representations”- called by Russell “logical forms” 
and by Husserl “essences”-  can be seen as the last effort to rescue from the 
ancient philosophy the quest for seriousness, purity and rigor.  
The Kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting together to produce 
knowledge was not only rescued but also was used as the means to distinguish 
philosophy from psychology: philosophy, in this sense, stays to empirical science 
as the study of structure to the study of content. 
Rorty’s attempt in his famous work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature45 is to 
challenge this Kantian foundation reminding us of Sellars’s behavioristic critique 
of the whole framework of the givenness and Quine’s behavioristic approach to 
the necessary-contingent distinction. 
Quine’s and Sellars’ way of thinking can be considered as a form of holism in that 
knowledge cannot be conceived of as an accurate representing- as the Mirror of 
Nature-, since such accuracy requires a theory of privileged representations which 
are automatically and intrinsically accurate. 
Their holism would depend on the thesis that justification is not a matter of a 
special relation between ideas and objects, but of conversation, of social practice: 
 
Conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification 
embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic. … The crucial premise of 
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this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of 
belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation.46 
 
Conversation then replaces confrontation and the idea of the mind as mirror of the 
Nature can be dispelled; philosophy, in this view, cannot have the role of a 
metapractice defined to exercise the critique of all possible forms of social 
practice: philosophy is no more a quest for certainty. 
 Notwithstanding  Sellars’ holism, his writing, according to Rorty, would be still 
permeated with the notion of analysis and with a tacit use of the distinction 
between the necessary and the contingent, the structural and the empirical; Sellars 
de facto is not as distrustful of these distinctions as Quine: while the latter 
believes that the notion of meaning would involve commitment to shady entities 
which, then, are worthy of being abandoned, the former retains that meanings per 
se may well be vague, even if meaning talk is classificatory. If classifications 
were not vague, then we could not find a logical space for linguistic tokens like 
“tall”, “short”, “fat” and so on. 
Willem DeVries argues this subject of matter as: 
 
Sellars thus sees no need to call the very idea of the analytic-synthetic or the a priori-a posteriori 
distinctions into question, although his position implies that these distinctions are not the sharp-
edged distinctions the logical positivists assumed they were.47  
 
Sellars, however, keeps the analytic-synthetic distinction separate from the a 
priori-a posteriori distinction, for the former distinction concerns formal truth, 
while the latter has to do with material truths; it is the notion of material truth 
which permits Sellars to define better his notion of the synthetic a priori: the good 
inferences in fact which are contained in the conceptual framework of an 
expression are not all the formal inferences:  if the material rule of inference by 
virtue of which “x is colored” can be validly inferred from “x is red”  is a good 
one, then the proposition “All red things are colored” can be seen as a synthetic a 
priori proposition. 
Sellars, notwithstanding his endorsement of synthetic a priori propositions, cannot 
be considered a Kantian, for there is no need to believe that, like in Kant, there is 
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a single synthetic a priori proposition that is an element of all possible languages 
or conceptual frameworks. 
De Vries gives further details on Sellars’ endorsement: 
 
In this respect, Sellars is more Hegelian than Kantian, for he recognizes that the synthetic a priori 
truths and even the set of categories we operate with are, potentially, dynamic, changing under the 
impact of both experience and reflection.48  
    
 
Rorty makes a point of the impossibility for analytic philosophy to be written 
without one or the other of these distinctions: for this reason, the analytic 
movement in the present stage, as an entrenched school of thought, would lack of 
metaphilosophical reflection and of methodological self-consciousness. 
Quine and Sellars raise behaviorist questions about the epistemic status of 
assertions warranted by privileged assertions: for Sellars one point of interest lies 
in the reason we have, if we have, to distinguish between the authority of first-
person reports and that of expert reports; the certainty of “I have a pain”  would 
be then  a reflection of the fact that nobody cares to question it, not conversely: 
 
Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than 
the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism’, an 
attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein.49  
 
If , however, we interpret epistemological behaviorism as a kind of holism 
according to which to understand the rules of language amounts to understand the 
way moves are made in that language50, we must accept the premise that 
epistemic notions must be explicated only in behavioral terms, that is to say, 
remarks like “S knows that” must be interpreted as remarks about the status of S’s 
reports among his peers and not as remarks mirroring the world. 
If this premise is well accepted, then philosophy comes down to a therapeutic tool 
for straightening out quarrels between common sense and philosophy and nothing 
else. 
According to this point of view, Sellars’ account of first-person contemporary 
reports is grounded on the following conviction: to say that this kind of reports are 
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incorrigible is to say that “nobody has yet suggested a good way of predicting and 
controlling human behavior which does not take sincere first-person 
contemporary reports of thoughts at face-value”. 
Behaviorist attitude is not only a matter of “adequacy”, but it claims simply that 
philosophy ought to offer common sense about knowledge and truth; it amounts to 
a rejection of a sort of explanation which tries to expound the reliability of reports 
about the world or the mind by using notions like “acquaintance with meanings” 
or “acquaintance with sensory data”. 
If we are legitimated to postulate such abstract entities as helpful tools for 
entrenching our causal explanations, we cannot interpret them as premises from 
which to infer our knowledge of other entities: 
 
What we cannot do is to take knowledge of these “inner” or “abstract” entities as premises from 
which our knowledge of other entities is normally inferred, and without which the latter 
knowledge would be “ungrounded”.51  
 
This is a move which is attempted for the first time by Wittgenstein who 
dethrones the myth according to which rationality would consist in a state of 
constraint under rules. The Austrian philosopher makes a great work by 
dissolving the traditional notion of analyticity, by replacing the traditional term 
“coherence”, intended as a kind of  “glue” which connects one element of the 
discourse with the other, with a colored linguistic context:  the idea of necessity, 
then is destined to disappear.  
Coherence, in the traditional debate, is conceived metaphorically  as the force of a 
rope which goes through and links the steps and the phases of thought and 
language; in Wittgenstein’s point of view however, the force of a rope would 
consist much more in the fibre interlacements: 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; 
for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form a 
family. 
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 
“number”? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have 
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hitherto been called number; and this may be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things 
that we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist 
fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one  fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. 
But if someone wished to say: “There is something common to all these constructions—namely 
the disjunction of all their common properties”—I should reply: Now you are only playing with 
words. One might as well say: “Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous 
overlapping of these fibres”.52  
 
The issue of behaviorism in epistemology is not the adequacy or the explanation 
of a fact, but , much more that of inquiring  whether a practice of justification can 
be given a grounding in a fact; this does not mean that knowledge is cut off from 
the world, but only that justification is a practice referred to what we already 
accept, so that we cannot  “get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find 
some test other than coherence”53. 
Sellars however cannot be defined a coherentist in the classical sense, since he 
does not maintain that all knowledge is inferential: perceptual and introspective 
reports, as a matter of fact, can be considered as instances of noninferential 
knowledge54; according to the American philosopher, both the foundationalist and 
the coherentist positions conceal a position similar to that of “the myth of the 
Given” and they do so in linking together the notions of noninferential and self-
justifying55. He tries, on the contrary, to keep these notions distinct, formulating a 
theory in which noninferential knowledge doesn’t amount to self-justifying 
knowledge. 
There is no a “permanent neutral matrix”  to regard some scientific or moral 
assumptions more rational than others; if we dispense with foundations or 
ontological grounds, then we implicitly admit that the only cultural criticism 
admitted is that which goes on piecemeal and partial without any referring to 
eternal standards.  
Sellars’ opposition to Platonism consists in his throwing back any attempt to 
measure the worth of every assertion and action by recurring to the notion of 
correspondence instead of that of coherence. 
Rorty, however , affirms that Sellars cannot get along without appealing to a 
residual form of Platonism: 
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Unfortunately, both men tend to substitute correspondence to physical entities, and specifically to 
the ‘basic entities’ of physical science (elementary particles, or their successors).56 
 
As to the residual form of Platonism present in Sellars, it can be said that the 
American philosopher does not belong to those radical nay-sayers which not only 
deny much of the metaphysical architecture, dismissing it as mere non-sense, but 
they also reject the metaphysical project itself. Sellars, on the contrary, aims at 
constructing a metaphysics in which you can find some truths which have not the 
form of evidences (as in Descartes), but that of complexes in which competing 
insights balance reciprocally in several different dimensions: 
 
Classical rationalism… made explicit the grammar of epistemological and metaphysical 
predicates, but- owing to certain confusions, particularly with respect to meaning and existence- 
came to the mistaken conclusion that philosophical statements were factual statements, albeit of a 
particular kind. Classical empiricism, on the other hand, argued that these statements were 
common or garden variety factual statements, and usually put them in the psychological species. 
Rationalism gave the grammar, but contaminated it with platonizing factualism. Classical 
empiricism threw out the platonizing, but continued to factualize, and confused the grammar of the 
philosophical predicates by attempting to identify them with psychological predicates….57 
 
The importance of Quine’s and Sellars’ enterprise would lie in their declining 
every attempt to reduce norms, rules, justifications to facts, generalizations and 
explanations; this strategy has a positive outcome insofar as they do not want to 
offer any account to be tested for adequacy: the idea, that is to say, of an account 
of human knowledge is futile. 
According to them, rationality of science is not due to the fact that it has a 
foundation (Sellars) or it has an architectonic structure (Quine): science is for the 
first a “self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not 
all at once”58 , while for the second it resembles a field of force in which there are 
no assertions immune from revision. 
Sellars’ project, in particular, can be seen as a Kantian response to the dominant 
empiricism of the XX century; the manifest and the scientific images are, as a 
matter of fact, transcendentally ideal frameworks because they are human 
constructs; to put it in other words, any conceptual framework determine some 
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synthetic a priori truths, including valid forms of material inference, even if there 
is no set of absolute truths. 
Every conceptual framework has necessarily a prescriptive or normative 
dimension: they are in  act constituted by valid inferences, formal and material, 
and by the responses and behaviors that are permitted by them. 
Science itself, contain methods which consist also of prescriptive claims; 
according to Sellars however, the prescriptive dimension of science is not 
complete, insofar scientists do not deal with questions, such as the legitimacy of 
some scientific investigations. 
In this sense, science, even if promoting our epistemic welfare, can contribute to 
the broader intersubjective intention to promote our welfare unconditionally59. 
Science thus can have practical relevance or reality, even if it is the manifest 
image that retains practical priority over the scientific: the scientific image raises 
in fact practical issues it is not in a position to answer: 
 
The practical reality of scientific objects, as such,  however, is extrinsic to them. Their practical 
reality is not intrinsic to them, for it is not, for instance, tied in to their identity and individuation 
conditions60. 
 
The most important point however in Sellars’ account of science is the claim that 
no theory of representation provides a good explanation of how science goes on: 
that is, no account of nature can rely on a theory of representations which stand in 
privileged relations to reality. 
To better appreciate this matter of fact, we need to reflect upon Sellars’ account of 
the nature of scientific laws. 
Sellars’ account of scientific laws can be seen as mediation and synthesis of what 
he considers as positive insights contained in the empiricist and the rationalist 
poles61: putting it in other words, the empiricist is right in claiming that the world 
contains only constant conjunctions of events (there is no place for causal power), 
but, on the other hand, the rationalist is right in claiming that the language of 
causal necessity is an irreducible element of rational discourse about the world, 
even if P-entailments have no descriptive significance. 
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Sellars’ account of the role of causal necessity is similar to that regarding the role 
of observation basis: they have both a methodological significance. 
The American philosopher then regards laws as material rules of inference, that 
is, as rules that permit us to move from statement X to statement Y where X and 
Y are nonlogical terms: a law like “water boils at 212o F” can be rendered by 
“from ‘x is water’ infer ‘x boils at 212o F’”. 
 Gary Gutting writes: 
 
The most immediate motivation for regarding laws as material rules of inference is to desire to 
implement the ideate that necessity of laws does not correspond to an ontological fact but rather to 
a methodological directive. If laws are rules of inference, then their direct function is to tell us 
what we ought to do, not what is the case. (This construal paves the way for Sellars’ own version 
of a pragmatic “vindication” of induction…).62 
 
This interpretation of the nature of scientific laws is tied intimately to Sellars’ 
theory of meaning and to his rejection of the epistemological given; Sellars, in 
particular, makes clear that there is no such thing as pre-linguistic awareness 
which would provide the special sort of certainty associated with the visual 
perception: 
 
All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities- indeed, 
all awareness of particulars- is a linguistic affair.63  
 
Awareness intended as being in the logical space of reasons and not as a 
discriminative behavior is justified true belief: the ability then to respond to 
stimuli (discriminative behavior) is a causal condition for knowledge but not a 
ground for knowledge; moreover, the empiricist account of knowledge according 
to which concepts and particulars are temporally prior to any propositional 
knowledge is, on the basis of the above view, misguided.  
If, however, there is no such thing as a justified belief which is not propositional,  
how pre-linguistic children can be said to know i.e. what red is in a sense different 
from the color discrimination of, say, a photoelectric cell? 
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Sellars introduces to solve this problem the distinction between “knowing what X 
is like” and “knowing what sort of thing an X is” ; children see or, more general, 
feel the same thing (a red ball, e.g.) before and after language-learning: 
 
Before language, he is said to know the thing he feels just in case it is the sort of thing which in 
later life he will be able to make noninferential reports about.64 
 
Children are then different from photoelectric cells for they have this “latent 
ability”  which will be developed when they will grasp the relevant vocabulary, 
for, according to Sellars, to have a concept is to use a word and, more 
particularly, we cannot have a concept without having many. 
The distinctions made above supply the theoretical ground to overtake the 
obstacles created by the myth of the Given since, according to this myth, there is a 
connection, a grounding relation, between knowing what something is like and 
knowing that sort of thing something is. 
In Sellars’ point of view, language does not produce “inner” changes, but let us 
enter a community in which assertions can be justified and so legitimated :one 
thing is to explain the acquisition of language, another thing, very different from 
the former, is to understand the justification of human knowledge which rests on a 
social practice: 
 
Once again, Sellars falls back on saying that justification is a matter of social practice, and that 
everything which is not a matter of social practice is no help in understanding the justification of 
human knowledge, no matter how helpful it may be in understanding its acquisition .65 
 
Summarizing: the greater mistake made by the epistemological tradition was to 
confuse the causal process of acquiring knowledge with questions regarding its 
justification: in this perspective, Sellars’ commitment to philosophy is similar to 
Wittgenstein’s effort in the Investigations: it is, ultimately, the “natural corollary” 
of  the Tractatus’s separation between fact-stating  assertions and others uses of 
language (ethical, religious, aesthetical and so on). 
In other words, Sellars’ attempt is to turn outward what the philosophical tradition 
has turned inward , regarding knowledge as depending on social context rather 
than on relations between inner representations seen as the touchstone of truth. 
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2. Sellars’ theory of knowledge 
Before touching some issues about Sellars’ conception of  knowledge, it is worth 
giving briefly Sellars’ view of the role of philosophy among the disciplines of the 
intellect. Sellars tries, from the very beginning of his philosophical enterprise, to 
balance competing insights which constitute the epistemological domain: 
empiricism, rationalism, foundationalism, coherentism, externalism, internalism, 
realism, phenomenalism, idealism. 
In this sense, Sellars’ philosophical discourse can be seen as an attempt to  
maintain a central position with respect to all the above mentioned insights, 
preserving the best results or fruits of every position; we can, however, retain a 
central position only by acknowledging  the most important pair of opposing 
pitfalls: the coherentism  that rejects any rational external constraint and the myth 
of the Given which offers “exculpations” where what we need is “justifications”66. 
Only by stopping oscillation between these pitfalls, we may arrive at a 
consideration of empirical knowledge as a co-operation between sensibility and 
understanding; according to John McDowell, one way of disposing of these 
pitfalls would consist in assuming that understanding is already implicated in the 
deliverances of sensibility: 
 
Experiences are impressions made by the world on our senses, products of receptivity; but those 
impressions themselves already have conceptual content.67 
Sellars supports the above position by denying that there would be a basic level at 
which knowledge is a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if this 
immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge. 
According to the most American philosopher, to defend the notion of Given 
would mean to affirm that there is a difference between inferring that something 
is the case and seeing it to be the case;68 it is however remarkable to note that the 
word “Given” is intended by Sellars as a piece of professional-epistemological 
talk, which carries with it a substantial theoretical commitment. 
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At the core of sense-datum theories there is a distinction between an act of 
awareness and the object of this act: acts moreover are often characterized as 
“phenomenologically simple” that is to say, not further analyzable. 
Sense-datum theorists, in this point of view, argue that in perception we are not 
directly related to physical objects, but to sense data which, in some way, would 
mirror the ontological status of the real objects. 
The major point of Sellars’ view is the idea that numerous tensions are hidden in 
sense-datum theories that can be characterized in these terms: 
1) knowledge of facts versus knowledge of particulars; 
2) learned versus unlearned cognitive capacities; 
3) factualism about knowledge versus non-naturalism about knowledge; 
4) inner episodes as causal intermediaries of empirical knowledge versus 
inner episodes as epistemic intermediaries of empirical knowledge.  
Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both instrumentally 
and nonepistemically: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor 
are they primordial knowings; they would belong to the causal order rather than 
to the cognitive one . 
Sensations do mediate and guide our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if 
this knowledge is not a “second-class knowing” inferred from the knowledge of 
items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is direct but mediated. 
For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are states of 
perceivers that are nonepistemic in character and depending on external causes; 
sensations are a necessary condition of the intentional order, even if they do not 
belong to this order. 
Sellars does not accept Ryle’s talk of “category mistake”, for he retains that not 
only inner episodes are not category mistakes, but they are quite “effable” in 
intersubjective discourse ; according to Sellars, as a matter of fact,  the concepts 
of sense impressions must be: 
 
Primarily and essentially inter-subjective, without being resolvable into overt behavioral 
symptoms, and that the reporting role of these concepts, their role in introspection, the fact that 
each of us has a privileged access to his impressions, constitutes a dimension of these concepts 
which is built on and presupposes their role in intersubjective discourse. It also makes clear why 
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the “privacy” of these episodes is not the “absolute privacy” of the traditional puzzles. For, as in 
the case of thoughts, the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very 
logic of these concepts.69  
 
Sellars, to some extent, warns against confusing the creative enrichment, made 
possible by the language of impressions,  of the framework of the empirical 
knowledge with an analysis of knowledge in itself: to put it in other words, the 
normative character of knowledge cannot be confused with the factual character 
of the same; in some sense, the language of impressions is an act of believing and 
deciding, a construing of data and the Given  in the sense of a taking imposition: 
 
He [Jones] construes as data the particulars and arrays of particulars which he has come to be able 
to observe, and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in 
the framework from the beginning. It is in the very act of taking that he speaks of the given.70  
 
As argued by Robert Brandom, our concepts of things cannot depend on the fact 
that we have first observed them, for, in observing things, we must presuppose in 
some way the concept of these. 
To notice something amounts then, in epistemically terms, to answer to its 
presence by applying a concept in a non inferential judgment: I am aware of “red 
things” only if a possess the concept “red”; if we lack then the concept “red” we 
cannot observe or we cannot be aware of red things, even if we can respond 
discriminately to them. 
Unfortunately, according to Brandom, Sellars does not make clear explicitly his 
attitude toward empiricism and this would depend on the difficulty to establish if 
he is giving his thesis or he is laying out thesis of other scholars. 
Sellars, to some extent, shares the idea of the empiricists according to which the 
capacity of having classificatory beliefs of the form “x is F” is acquired, even if he 
does not accept the idea that the formation of concepts and the warranty of their 
non inferential application would depend on the existence of non verbal  and non 
conceptual inner episodes. 
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At this point of the analysis, therefore, it arises the question if we can break out of 
our creative language and discourse to an archè beyond language and discourse; if 
every given is an act of taking, that is, something tied to our activities and, more 
generally, to our subjectivity, it emerges the question if we can climb over the 
boundary constituted by our languages toward the comprehension of a given 
intended in its autonomy; we cannot thus assimilate sensations to the intentional 
order, even if we are allowed to state that, in some way, these states of the 
perceiver are related to the cognitive order. 
In Sellars’ opinion, we are tempted to see sensations as epistemic firstly because 
there is a grammatical similarity between the language of sensations (“a sensation 
of a green and round thing”) and the language we adopt to refer to and 
characterize items of the cognitive order (“a thought of a green and round thing”); 
secondly, from a logical point of view, “there is a sensation of a green and round 
thing” fails to entail “there is a green and round thing” just as “there is a thought 
of a pink elephant” fails to entail “there is a pink elephant”. 
It is also important to note that the use of analogy between sensations and 
physical things can be very dangerous: we can, for instance, introduce sensations 
of red triangles or sensations of green balls by analogy to red triangles and black 
blackboards, but we cannot make the same thing about sensations of pain or 
pleasure: these sensations, in fact, are not inner replicas of any physical objects. 
We  cannot neglect also the fact that the problem concerning sensations is tied, in 
Sellars, to how we can “define” a person: persons are individuals that have 
perceptible characteristics and behave in perceptible ways; the behavior concerns, 
first of all, the use of language intended as a “thinking-out-loud” and the 
meaningfulness of which is to be found in the coherence exhibits not only within 
it, but also in its relation to the contexts in which it occurs. 
However,  this “austere conception” of the person can be extended and, more 
particularly, enriched by introducing the notion of “sensing”: 
 
Thus sensings were introduced as theoretical states involved in the explanation, for example, of 
how it could seem to a person that there is a pink ice cube in front of him when in point of fact 
there is not. In both the veridical perception of a pink ice cube and a perceptual experience which 
would be veridical if  there were such a object in front of one, the person senses a-pink-cubely, or, 
in more familiar terms, has a sensation of a pink cube (where ‘of a pink cube’ is to be construed 
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depth-grammar-wise as an adjective) so that the expression might be parse ‘an of-a-pink-cube 
sensation’71. 
 
Persons, according to Sellars, are basic objects for which a value-free description 
is meaningless: they have a normativity which is natural and intrinsic; in the 
manifest image then, the practical reality of persons is foundational: whereas 
persons possess intrinsic values, objects have value only in relation  to persons; 
secondly, persons have states and behaviors which have value. 
It comes into being also the problem of matching this analysis of persons with the 
conception that science ought to be considered as the measure of what is that it is 
and what is not that it is not, for, from an empirical point of view, persons are 
dependent objects, complexes of objects posited by science. 
Persons, however, are not artifacts, even if they, together with their attendant 
properties (such as intentional states), bear some analogies with artifacts; beliefs 
or intentions, in Sellars’ theory of intentionality are functional states in that every 
attribution of intentionality to a human subject requires that the subject of the 
intentional state participates in a complete, intersubjective community; this 
functionality is all that counts to the concept of intentionality which is built on a 
background of rule-governed practices and institutions. 
This does not mean that persons and their intentions are demoted by Sellars to 
mere illusions, lacking of ontological reality; they, as a matter of fact, are 
phenomena available only to a particular  point of view: “The point of view of a 
self-conscious, rational, logic-using agent who is a member of a community that 
is, individually and collectively, engaged in pursuing various ends in a world it 
did not make”.72  
 
3. Perceiving as thinking 
Sellars regards knowledge as belonging in a normative context so that when we 
characterize an episode as that of knowing, we do not give an empirical 
description of that episode or state: we are placing it in the logical space of 
reasons where only justifications count. 
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If, as a matter of fact, the normative context in which knowledge is shaped is 
neglected, epistemology is liable to fall into a naturalistic fallacy as pointed out 
by John McDowell: 
 
Sellars separates concepts that are intelligible only in terms of how they serve to place things in the 
logical space of reasons, such as the concept of knowledge, from concepts that can be employed in 
‘empirical description’. And if we read the remark as a warning against a naturalistic fallacy, we 
are understanding “empirical description” as placing things in the logical space of nature, to coin a 
phrase that is Sellarsian at least in spirit73. 
 
Epistemology ought to avoid the impasses of representationalism and 
phenomenalism,  affirming that the objects of basic knowings are physical objects 
and that there is no more basic form of knowledge than perceiving physical 
objects. 
To investigate this matter further, we ought to be certain about the structure of 
perceptual experience; first of all, we must admit that perceiving essentially 
involves thinking: perceiving therefore presupposes a knowledge of general truths 
about material things. 
To comprehend this point better, we ought to admit that ontology cannot be 
severed from epistemology “as with a knife”:74 according to Sellars, as a matter of 
fact, attributions of objectual knowledge amount to attributions of generalized 
propositional knowledge and even of know-how knowledge: if “George knows 
Rome”, then “George knows how to get around in the city” where things are so 
and so. 
Knowledge of particulars thus cannot itself be the independent foundation of all 
propositional knowledge; propositional knowledge itself depends causally on the 
know-how we manifest in making material inferences: at this point we find 
Sellars’ pragmatist strain. 
Nevertheless, perceiving is not merely thinking: there is a descriptive core of 
seeing, e.g. a seen yellow square distinguishes itself from merely thinking about a 
yellow square; we have to sort out then a propositional component and a 
descriptive core.  
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In Sellars’ view however, perception is more than merely sensing and, for this 
reason, can be characterized as an awareness of a this-such; seeing something as 
yellow is a conceptual process which is the slow building up of a multi-
dimensional pattern of linguistic responses. 
Experience  is a matter of identifying individuals as instances of a kind and, for 
this reason, is literally a thinking involving a propositional component which 
cannot be reduced to a limited number of kind concepts, because it presupposes a 
whole battery of concepts.  
This way of interpreting our perceptual awareness of any fact corresponds to our 
understanding of the way thinking goes on: not in bit and pieces. 
What said above has much to do with Sellars’ conception of philosophy: to 
understand the way we think or perceive, we have to “stumble on the familiar” 
and to feel a “haunting sense of alienation”, trying to become reflectively at home 
in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of 
which we suffer, think, and act. We must begin by constructing simple models of 
fragments of this multidimensional patterns even if we cannot be never satisfied 
with them for the reason that they can be connected with other systems: 
 
And, indeed, the ultimate justification for system building in philosophy is the fact that no model 
for any region of discourse-perceptual, discursive, practical, can be ultimately satisfying unless its 
connection with each of the others is itself modeled.75  
 
To stress this idea amounts to reject a characteristic form of the Myth of the Given 
according to which there must be a structure of a  particular matter of fact such 
that: i) each fact can be non-inferentially known to be the case ii) and this 
noninferential knowledge would constitute the ultimate court of appeals for all 
factual claims. 
The idea of a privileged stratum  of fact rests on the familiar assumption that 
knowledge, at this level, ought to be noninferential, ultimate and provided with 
authority; this amounts to say that the statements concerning this level, must 
involve a kind of credibility without which they cannot rise to the dignity of 
knowledge. The kind of credibility which gets into  these statements would not 
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depend on the credibility of other statements: there seems to be a class of 
statements which fill some of these requirements, statements which report 
observations such as “This is green”. 
These statements are made as to “involve those so called token-reflexive 
expressions which, in addition to the tenses of verbs, serve to connect the 
circumstances in which a statement is made with its sense”.76 
Anyway, it seems that a sentence token, whether it contains a token-reflexive 
expression or not, can acquire credibility in two ways: 
(a) inherited from a type authority as in the case of tokens of a sentence type 
like ‘2+2=4’ ; 
(b) gained by the fact that credibility arouse in a certain set of circumstances  
as in sentences like “ This is green”.  
Since no empirical sentence type appears to have intrinsic credibility, this means 
that credibility must accrue to some empirical sentence types by virtue of their 
logical relations to certain sentence tokens the authority of which is not derived 
from the authority of sentence types: 
 
The picture we get is that of their being two ultimate modes of credibility: (1) The intrinsic 
credibility of analytic sentences, which accrues to tokens as being tokens of such a type; (2) the 
credibility of such tokens as ‘express observations’, a credibility which flows from tokens to 
type.77 
 
The second mode of credibility commits one to believe that the authority of the 
observation reports, also Konstatierungen, would rest on non verbal episodes of 
awareness which have an intrinsic authority: 
 
One is committed to a stratum of authoritative nonverbal episodes (‘awareness’), the authority of 
which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actions, provided that the expressions occurring in 
these actions are properly used .78 
 
To surmount the perplexities bound to the empiricist view, we must begin to 
assume, firstly, that a report can be correct “as being an instance of a general 
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mode of behavior  which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to 
sanction and to support”79; secondly, that the authority of a report must be 
recognized by the person whose report it is.  
According to this view then, to make an observation report expressed by a token 
like “This is yellow” does not amount to follow the uniform behavior of a 
thermometer. 
 
4. Sellars on reductionism 
The questions discussed hitherto make a point of another important issue treated 
by Sellars in an original way: how to approach reductionism. 
According to Sellars, a principle of object reduction can be stated in the following 
way: 
 
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in 
the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations or, 
roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and relations between, its 
constituents.80  
 
This is clearly and explicitly a principle of object reduction for: if an object has a 
property that does not consist of properties of and relations between its 
constituents, then that thing cannot be reduced within that framework: a person, 
for example, is a complex object and has constituents, but it is irreducible because 
not all of its properties consist in facts about its constituents,  qualities and 
relations; a person is, in that framework, a basic object. 
The principle of reduction nevertheless cannot be applied to colors of physical 
objects in the Manifest Image for the assumption that the micro-physical particles 
constituting the object ought to be colored makes no sense. 
Being  Sellars’ principle of reduction grounded on the criterion of property 
reduction , it is reasonable to think that manifest physical objects cannot be 
reduced to systems of microphysical objects, since the former have proper 
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sensible properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the systems of 
microparticles. 
Sellars distinguishes between an intra-theoretic property reduction and an inter-
theoretic property reduction; in the case of the chemical theory and the micro-
physical theory, he states that the current predicates and primitives of both 
theories are to be considered as predecessors of concepts in an encompassing 
theory in which there can be found an adequate definitional relation between the 
two different theoretical kind of predicates. 
What about raw feel predicates? 
It seems that any reduction must be dismissed, since raw feel predicates especially 
are untheoretical, but, according to Sellars, this is false for raw-feel predicates can 
be construed as theoretical: 
 
…if both raw-feel and brain-state predicates are theoretical predicates, can we not conceive of a 
reduction of raw-feel theory to brain-state theory? 81 
 
Raw-feel predicates can be also, according to Sellars, primitive predicates in a 
unified theory, because they remain non definable in this theory; but, to avoid 
misunderstanding, it is important to remark that undefined predicates are not for 
this reason meaningless, for their meaning depends on the role they play in 
language-entry, language-exit and intralinguistic transitions82. 
Returning to the question of reducibility, Sellars affirms that in a to be achieved 
sense-impression- brain-state theory, the logical space of sense-impressions shall 
be “transposed into a new key and located in a new context”83, avoiding every 
possibility of reduction. 
The non reductive alternative is preferable for Sellars, since he thinks that the set 
of primitives necessary to scientific explanation and description of non living-
objects are not adequate to describe and explain sentience organisms: a proper 
explanation of sentience organism may introduce new entities that are not called 
in the explanation of the behavior of non-sentient objects. 
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According to Sellars, proper sensible, i.e. colors, odors, must receive a special 
ontological treatment in an ultimately satisfactory scientific theory: this argument 
has been dubbed the “grain argument” which can be divided in two stages: 
1. Colors (odors and the like) cannot be really properties of physical objects 
per se; are then they modifications of mind? 
2. Proper sensibles cannot be reduced to modifications of brain qua system of 
micro-particles. 
 
As noticed by deVries this argument leaves us with a stark choice: 
 
…either the proper sensibles are (modifications of) immaterial or nonphysical things, or they are 
so totally illusory that nothing in the world explains them, or we have to provide for them in the 
scientific picture of the world, for example, recognize in the ultimate scientific image basic 
particulars to which the sensible predicates directly apply.84  
 
According to Richardson and Muhlenberg85 Sellars, in the long run, would not 
press for irreducibility; instead of it, he would appreciate an argument designed to 
accomodate sense impressions within a reductionist program. 
In doing so, Sellars would make use of successive approximations and revisions, 
starting e.g. from an Aristotelian conception of persons as single logical subjects 
to arrive at a final sophistication according to which persons are complexes 
standing in relations to other complexes: persons, in this last image, sense even if 
their sensings are reducible states.  
Even regarding Sellars as  a reductionist, it does not mean that he would 
acknowledge the truth of the following statement: manifest objects are identical 
with the systems of imperceptible particles countenanced by micro-theory. 
After having distinguished between structural properties, which are 
unproblematically reducible as a ladder and its constituents (rungs, frame and so 
on), and content properties, a red brick wall every constituent of which ( brick) 
has the property redness, we can say that Sellars’ point is to claim that manifest 
objects cannot be construed as having structural properties. 
However, it seems plausible to say that the first step of Sellars’ account of 
reductionism would be the rejection of the view which considers manifest and 
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scientific images as consistent systems operating at distinct levels of analysis: 
science, according to this thesis, would provide a superior account of the world.  
The American philosopher, distinguishing between ontological and 
methodological arguments, denies that sciences have right to an epistemological 
primacy for the reason that they are dependent upon the framework of common 
sense for observations.86  
Sellars’ acknowledgment of the superiority of the scientific image would depend, 
as it were, only on its greater degree of explanatory coherence a formulation of 
which might be termed, according to Richardson and Muhlenberg, an “inter-
framework decision procedure”: 
 
In crude fashion, that framework which serves to most adequately describe and explain the 
phenomena concerned (i.e., the observable behavior of objects and persons, particularly the 
perceptual functioning of sentient organism) is the framework which must finally be taken the 
measure of what is real.87  
 
Explanatory coherence is a multidimensional maximizing of the integration of 
theoretical principles and  the accuracy of prediction. 
The weak point of Sellars’ position seems to be the lacking of a criterion 
according to which we can judge a framework better than another, since there may 
be many successful ways of describing and explaining the world resting on 
different purposes and ends. 
According to Richardson and Muhlenberg on the other hand, by using the notion 
of alternative modes of reconstruction or revision of conceptual frameworks, we 
could acquire a good criterion for choosing between contrasting alternatives; the 
criterion required would be: given two or more alternative modes of 
reconstruction or revision, that alternative is best which (a) is the simplest and (b) 
maximizes explanatory coherence. 
Sellars seems interested, following Charles Peirce, in an ultimate normal science, 
that is, in a science as it will be in the future when all the facts are in; the 
American philosopher has the expectation that the ultimate scientific image of 
man will be deterministic, even if he recognizes that, in the present state of 
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science, it is not reasonable to held a deterministic position. At any sense, he 
wouldn’t be so happy to abandon his belief in free will with a sense of liberation. 
 
5. The myth of the Given 
By rejecting the framework of traditional empiricism, Sellars don’t stress the fact 
that empirical knowledge has no foundation, since there is some point to the 
picture of human knowledge as resting on a special kind of knowledge (e.g self-
authenticating reports); however, the metaphor of foundation is misleading: 
 
… in that it keeps us from seeing that there is a logical dimension in which other empirical 
propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest 
on the former88. 
 
The rationality of empirical knowledge doesn’t depend on the fact that it has a 
foundation, but much more on the fact that it is a self-correcting enterprise, 
questioning any claim, though not all at once. 
Sellars’ most important contribution to the demolition of the myth of the Given 
consists in his rejecting, as for Hegel, the idea of an exogenous Given  and 
claiming that the Given is not something imposed from outside the activity of 
adjusting the system of our beliefs.  
John McDowell underlines this point: 
 
We must think of empirical rationality in a dynamic way, in terms of a continuing adjustment to 
the impact of experience. To reject the idea of an exogenous Given is to follow this prescription in 
part. It is to refuse to conceive experience’s demands on a system of beliefs as imposed from 
outside the activity of adjusting the system, by something constituted independently of the current 
state of the evolving system, or a state into which the system might evolve. The required 
adjustments to the system depend on what we take experience to reveal to us, and we can capture 
that only in terms of the concepts and conceptions that figure in the evolving system. What we 
take experience to tell us is already part of the system, not an external constraint on it89. 
 
To paraphrase what is said above, we can appeal to the idea that conceptual 
capacities are passively operative in experience: a judgment that something is 
yellow is an exercise of spontaneity, although it needs, as any judging, a right 
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contribution of  passive experience. According to McDowell, this would be the 
same as assuming that i.e. concepts of ,say, colors are only minimally integrated 
into the active business of  accomodating one’s thinking to the deliverances of 
experience, even if no color judgment can be uttered unless it fit into some view 
of the world, being equipped with such things as the concept of visible surfaces of 
objects or the concept of suitable conditions for telling what something’s color is 
by looking at it: it is this kind of integration which enables experience to pass a 
scrutiny of its rational credentials. For this reason, concepts like being red and 
looking red are intelligible only on terms of each other as elements in a bundle of 
concepts that must be acquired together; only adopting this approach, we can 
make out that the space of reasons is more extensive than the conceptual realm so 
as to incorporate extraconceptual impingements from the outer world. The idea of 
the Given, according to McDowell, would offer “exculpations” for the outer 
influence of the world, whereas we would need “justifications”: 
 
But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in 
can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the 
idea of the given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications90.   
 
To better understand what is above discussed, we could attempt to think about a 
color concept: when this kind of concept is drawn into operation in an experience, 
the content of the latter is shaped by the  conceptual linkages of the former; by 
virtue of this integration in a whole network, the understanding of the experience 
by the subject contains a wider reality, embraceable in thought, than those brought 
out by the very same experience: 
 
Even in the case of colour experience, this integration allows us to understand an experience as 
awareness of something independent of the experience itself: something that is held in place by its 
linkage into the wider reality, so that we can make sense of the thought that it would be so even if 
it were not being experienced to be so.91  
 
What philosophers as Sellars or McDowell see as the greatest contribution of 
Wittgenstein’s thought is the idea that thinking does not stop short of facts; this 
means that the conceptual distinction  inward/outward does not work: 
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What is in question could not be the thinkable world, or, to put it another way, our picture of the 
understanding’s equipment could not be what it needs to be, a picture of a system of concepts and 
conceptions with substantial empirical content, if it were not already part of the picture that the 
system is the medium within which one engages in active thought that is rationally responsive to 
the deliverances of experience.92 
 
We ought to abandon thus the picture according to which there would be an outer 
boundary around the sphere of the conceptual which would impinge inwardly the 
system. 
This rejection is justified by the idea that this kind of boundary crossing would be 
a causal fact and not a rational: the impressions which impinge on our conceptual 
system and keep it in motion are already equipped with conceptual content. 
However, the arguments presented by Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind would not show, according to some scholars, that the Given is simply a 
myth.93 
A good philosophical move then would be to delete the idea of an outer boundary 
without falling into idealism, slighting in this way the independence of reality. 
 
6. Philosophy as a practical enterprise 
According to Sellars, the historical development of philosophy can be considered 
as the periodic formulation of new questions rather than as a series of answers to 
the same problems like  variations on the theme in music. 
Consequently, a philosophical system “dies” when the questions it attempts to 
answer are no longer asked; there is also another conception of philosophy 
according to which philosophy would give obvious answers, once questions are 
properly formulated: 
 
It suggests that the evolution of philosophical thought is accurately conceived neither as a series of 
different answers to the same questions, nor as a series of different sets of questions, but rather as 
the series of approximations by which philosophers move toward the discovery of the very 
questions they have been trying to answer all the time.94 
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A genuine advance of philosophy would consist then in the replacement of a 
confused question by a less confused one; in Sellars’ point of view, a 
philosophical theory can be attacked in two ways: reducing it to absurdity or 
tracing errors back to their roots; he prefers the latter method because it is 
capable of bringing  definitive results, while the former would leave the root 
confusion untouched: 
 
A mistaken theory can be compared to a symptom of a decease. By the use of inadequate 
medicaments one can often ‘cure’ the symptoms while leaving the disease untouched.95 
 
Thence philosophers can be seen to leap from the frying-pan of one absurdity into 
the fire of another one, incapable of breaking into this vicious circle.  
Sellars’ philosophical perspectives are guided by the metaphysical conviction that 
the distinguishing mark of real things is the power to act or be acted upon;96 this 
line of thought leads to a thoroughgoing naturalism that, remaining true to the 
“synoptic view”, acknowledges, for instance the relevance of the mind without 
assigning an ontological status to intentional entities. 
Sellars’ naturalism then is intimately connected with the idea that the aim of 
philosophy is a practical one, a form of know-how whose success is measured by 
the reflective realization of the philosophical paradigm of knowing one’s way 
around. 
In this sense, to be a good philosopher would amount to face the dialectical 
character of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the 
current conceptual framework: philosophy, in this sense, turns out to be not a 
once-and-for-all vision of humanity-in-the-world, since the way we fit into the 
world is not static; consequently, the achievement of a unitary vision of the world  
would resemble a Kantian regulative ideal. 
The task of the philosopher does not consist in giving analysis in the sense of 
definitions for, according to Sellars, the atomistic conception of philosophy, that 
is, the idea that each philosopher fences himself off in his own philosophical 
garden, is an illusion: analysis, nowadays, means more than the clarification of  
the logical structures of a multidimensional discourse: 
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…discourse not longer appears as one plane parallel to another, but as a tangle of intersecting 
dimensions whose relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to non single 
or simple pattern.97 
 
Distinguishing then the “journeyman tactics” from the “grand strategy”, Sellars 
retains that only the latter, if taken by philosophy,  can be directed toward an 
articulated and integrated vision of man-in-the-universe,  that is, toward a 
discourse-about-man-in-all-discourses.   
Modern philosophy shows interest in two conceptions of man-in-the-world, the 
manifest and the scientific, so that it cannot avoid the attempt to see “how they fall 
together in one stereoscopic view”; these two images represent two pictures of the 
same order of complexity which the philosopher ought to fuse into one vision. 
 
 
7. Naturalism 
Sellars’ commitment to naturalism, it has been said,  seems very problematic, 
since he does not support the hard reductionism which in the last decades 
accompanies every naturalistic philosophical project: the kind of naturalism 
supported by the American philosopher can be expressed, according to him, in 
this way: 
 
As for Naturalism. That, too, had negative overtones at home. It was as wishy-washy and 
ambiguous as Pragmatismus. One could believe almost anything about the world and even some 
things about God, and yet be a Naturalist. What was needed was a new, nonreductive materialism. 
My father could call himself a Materialist in all good conscience, for at that time he was about the 
only one in sight. I, however, do no own the term, and I am so surprised by some of the views of 
the new, new Materialists, that until the dust settles, I prefer the term ‘Naturalism’ which, while 
retaining its methodological connotations, has acquired a substantive content, which, if it does not 
entail scientific realism, is at least not incompatible with it .98 
 
To appreciate what Sellars intend by the term “Naturalism”, we have to stress his 
dislike for every form of reductionism: at the end of Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man, Sellars points out that by confronting the manifest image of world 
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with the scientific image, we feel us compelled to choice between the following 
alternatives: 
i) a dualism in which men as scientific objects are contrasted with “minds” 
which are persons’ attributes; 
ii) a monism according to which we must accept the exclusive reality of 
scientific objects; 
iii) a thesis according to which the status of theoretical frameworks is 
“calculational” or “auxiliary” in the sense that they serve or are 
subjected to the primacy of the manifest image. 
Sellars retains that none of these alternatives can be considered satisfactory and, 
believing this, he defends a philosophical approach that can be interpreted as 
nonreductionist; in his point of view, in fact, determinism itself is not among the 
conclusions of scientific inquiry, unless we intend it as part of a conceptual 
framework, i.e., the scientific image of man; following Charles Peirce, he has 
expectation that the ultimate scientific image of man in the world will be 
deterministic, even if he recognizes that, assumed the present state of science, 
contrary expectations can be reasonably held. 
He rejects a Spinozistic view of the relation  between the manifest image and the 
scientific one according to which the first would be false, while the second must 
be maintained; Sellars, as a matter of fact, aims at describing how the two images 
blend together. 
This position falls on in his philosophy of mind in which he, unlike Ryle, treats a 
large part of our mentalistic vocabulary as being explanatory as well as 
descriptive: by uttering the sentence “it is raining”, a man expresses, by way of 
this utterance, not only a proposition about the weather, but also an act of thought; 
moreover, this performed act of thought is normally part of the causal explanation 
of why the man uttered that sentence. 
What said above is part of Sellars’ antireductionist effort not merely to reconcile 
the conceptual framework of persons with the scientific image, but much  more to 
join the former to the latter, enriching the scientific image with the language of 
community and individual intentions and making the world, as conceived by 
scientific theory, the world in which we live, even if the incorporation of the 
former into the latter is, for the present, realized only in imagination. 
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Sellars advocates scientific realism insofar science is the measure of all things, of 
what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not99, but, in doing so, he is careful to 
distinguish between ontological priority (science) and methodological or 
epistemological priority (observational framework of common sense). The 
ontological priority is attributed to science for it would provide us with a greater 
degree of explanatory coherence; put in other words, the framework which more 
adequately describes and explains phenomena, ought to be taken as the measure 
of what is real. 
Once we admit what said above, we are however not committed to reject in 
extenso the common sense framework since a proposition formulated in this 
Weltanschauung cannot be questioned by, for example, an empirical proposition 
pertaining to the scientific domain: a case study that bears out this thesis is the 
claim that the sentence “physical objects have colors” would express an empirical 
proposition which, even if believed by common sense, has been shown by science 
to be false. 
Sellars explicates his ideas as follows: 
 
The idea that physical objects are not coloured can make sense only as the (misleading) expression 
of one aspect of a philosophical critique of the very framework of physical objects located in 
Space and enduring through Time. In short, ‘Physical objects are not really coloured’ makes sense 
only as a clumsy expression of the idea  that there are no such things as the coloured physical 
objects of the common sense world, where this is interpreted, not as an empirical proposition- like 
‘There are non nonhuman featherless bipeds’- within the common sense frame, but as the 
expression of a rejection (in some sense) of this very framework itself, in favor of another built 
around different, if not unrelated, categories.100  
 
If for maximizing “explanatory coherence”, we have to maximize the integration 
of theoretical principles, the accuracy of prediction and the overall scope of the 
theory in question, we arrive at an understanding of this enterprise in the terms of 
a multidimensional task, which is a character shared a lot by Sellars’ analysis of 
the frameworks by which we encounter the world. 
In effect, by reconstructing the two conceptual frameworks analyzed in 
Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind, Sellars makes use of a “principle of 
comprehension”, according to which “nothing in the phenomenal field is to be 
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completely repudiated, but rather relocated, and, hence, in an adequate 
explanation, accounted for”;101 in Sellars’ point of view, we have to accept the 
idea that we must be familiar with the trend of scientific enterprise, for, only in 
doing so, we can appreciate the framework categories of the manifest image of the 
world and the fact that scientific discourse is a continuation of a dimension of 
discourse already embedded in the common sense framework: 
 
…then one would expect there to be a sense in which the scientific picture of the world replaces 
the common sense picture; a sense in which the scientific account of ‘what there is’ supersedes the 
descriptive ontology of everyday life.102  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
WITTGENSTEIN’S REMARKS ON COLOURS1 
 
Summary 
My aim is to show how philosophical arguments regarding colours are treated 
very differently by Wittgenstein in the course of his philosophical research: from 
a logical point of view he would  pass, in a second period, to attend to the same 
issues in a different way involving the relation between logic and experience, 
between perception and language, or between logical and grammatical forms 
which concern the way by which we encounter reality. Philosophy ought not to be 
concerned with logical or mathematical constructions, idealised and abstracted 
forms which lose every contact with our Lebensformen, but it must be related to 
the different ways by which we can describe the great range of phenomenon 
which constitute our world. There is no place for explanation at this point of 
analysis or there are not supertheories which impose from above upon the facts or 
events of the world. At this level of the philosophical investigation it is no more 
possible to reduce a philosophical approach to another one which is very different 
from the former: i.e. linguistic analysis to phenomenology and conversely. 
As a conclusion, we could state that the language-game played by colour-words is 
something which presents itself, owing to the multidimensional complexity of its 
rules, with the character of “ineffability”, so that every attempt to reduce it to a 
more primitive game, or, worse still, to a conceptual scheme able to give an 
extrinsic explanation of its working goes wrong. 
For whom who desires to achieve a systematical reconstruction of philosophical 
issues this conclusion may result unsatisfying like a proposition of the following 
form: “  it does work and that's all”; but for the one who is satisfied with a 
descriptive and not a foundational approach to philosophical questions the same 
conclusion may appear adequate.  
 
80 
Giorgio Rizzo 
 
1. The colour-exclusion problem 
In the Tractatus we can find a place completely devoted to the colour exclusion 
problem: it is proposition 6.3751: 
 
For two colours, e.g. to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logical impossible, for it 
is excluded by the logical structure of colour. 
 
Therefore, the status of colour exclusion is acknowledged as a logical or analytic 
one; but, according to the definition of a logical proposition given in the Tractatus 
itself, this status cannot be allowed. 
We can trace all the difficulties which arise at this point of our analysis back to 
the Tractatus. 
In this work , a well-formed formula either depicts some facts, or is a logical one: 
the former class of propositions deals with facts, saying something about the 
world of which propositions are images (Bilder). 
The truth-value of a depicting proposition may be obtained by comparing the 
proposition itself with the world: proposition 2.223 states as a matter of fact:  
 
In order to discover whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality. 
 
A condition for such a proposition of being meaningful is the possibility to be true 
or false, not just to have one truth-value; this depends on the ontological status of 
facts which are contingent, that is, of facts which can happen or not.For this 
reason necessary facts do not exist, so that the truth-value of meaningful depicting 
propositions is a posteriori. 
Proposition 2.225 declares also: 
 
There is no picture which is a priori true.  
 
On the contrary, a well-formed formula has a truth-value a priori, excluding in 
this way the possibility to be identified with a depicting proposition; logical 
propositions, according to the Tractatus, have an a priori truth-value, as we can 
argue following proposition 4.46: 
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Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme cases.  
In the one case the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. 
We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. 
In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities. The truth-conditions are 
self-contradictory. 
In the first case we call the proposition a tautology, in the second case a contradiction.  
 
Whatever truth-value combinations the constituents of a tautological or a self-
contradictory proposition have, the resulting truth-value is invariable, that is to 
say, independent of the happening or not happening of any fact, thus a priori; 
consequently this kind of propositions does not depict any fact, they are not 
images.2 
Hence, if a proposition is a posteriori, it is a depicting one, while being an  a 
priori proposition means to be a logical one. 
Therefore we can deduce that the classes of a priori propositions and of logical 
propositions coincide with one another, as well as the classes of a posteriori 
propositions and that of depicting ones. 
Alleged this coincidence, it can be inferred that there are not synthetic a priori 
propositions, because it is impossible to say something about the world and at the 
same time to preserve the a priori status of the proposition involved. 
According to Roberto Ciuni3, the appeal to Husserl’s conception of analytic 
propositions (analytische notwendige Sätze) could be useful for a deeper 
comprehension of the problems involved by the colour exclusion problem. In the 
Third Logical Investigation Husserl points out: 
 
We may define analytically necessary propositions as propositions whose truth is completely 
independent of the peculiar content of their objects (whether thought of with definite or indefinite 
universality) and of any possible existential assertions. They are propositions which permit of a 
complete ‘formalization’ and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications of the 
formal, analytic laws whose validity appears in such formalizations. In an analytic proposition it 
must be possible, without altering the proposition’s logical form, to replace all material which has 
content, with an empty formal Something, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving 
all one’s judgements the form of universal, unconditional laws.4 
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Thus, the truth-value of analytically necessary propositions remains constant in 
every substitution instance of predicative and individual constants; in prop. 4.4661 
of  the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states that in a logical proposition the relation 
among signs (predicative or individual constants) does not matter: 
 
Of course the signs are also combined with one another in the tautology and contradiction, i.e. they 
stand in relations to one another, but these relations are meaningless, unessential to the symbol.  
 
Only combinations of the connectives are important in a logical proposition: this 
implies that a logical proposition keeps its truth-value in every substitution 
instance, so that it can be driven to the previous definition of an analytic 
proposition. 
As we have seen, in the Tractatus, the notions of necessity and impossibility have 
a logical nature (that is, tautology and contradiction), and for this reason they 
have an analytic character; but this means that necessity and impossibility are a 
priori. 
At this point of analysis, thence the problem concerning the colour exclusion 
arises: in fact a proposition like “R(p)t.B(p)t” states the co-presence of two 
colours at the same place and at the same time: is this proposition to be grasped as 
a logical impossibility, as a contradiction? 
Indeed, such a conjunction does not keep its truth-value in every substitution 
instance, since if one provides the previous proposition with a substitution like 
“This patch is red at time t and the same patch is small at time t”, one has a 
proposition which can be true or false, not a contradiction. 
Following Roberto Ciuni: 
 
Since, clearly, R(p)t.B(p)t does not have the form α.~ α (I’ll discuss this option later), it cannot be 
said to be a contradictory proposition, and so the colour exclusion cannot be a logical 
impossibility5. 
 
To avoid misunderstanding, it would be constructive to consider the role which 
the notion of elementary proposition plays in this problem: in the Tractatus, it is 
without doubt that an Elementarsatz is something stating relations of names in 
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“immediate combination”.6An elementary proposition deals with objects that have 
the mark of simplicity: the Tractatus does not provide us with a criterion for 
resolving simple objects in complex objects. 
Supporting Wittgenstein’s view on the contradictory, an analytic status of colour 
exclusion chooses an argument which recurs to the analysis of transformational 
laws which rule simple and complex objects. 
These laws establish links between objects (a) and links between atomic 
propositions (b). As regards (a) a link between objects (and names) such as 
“Red(x):=~Blue(x)”; as regards  
(b) a link between atomic propositions such as “a proposition contains  
‘Red(x)’ → the same proposition cannot contain ‘Blue (x)’”. 
“Red(x):=~ Blue(x)” is an example of what Wittgenstein calls in 6.3751 the 
“logical structure of colour”; but this example, as argued by Ciuni, does not solve 
the problem of colour exclusion. 
If “R(p)t.B(p)t” had an analytic or a priori character, then it would lead to a 
proposition like “~B(p)t.B(p)t”, that is a logical proposition. By this way, the 
Tractatus would be right in stating that “R(p)t.B(p)t” is a contradiction. However,  
if we argue in extensional terms (as it were, the way of reasoning adopted by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus), the truth conditions of being red are not the same 
as those of not being blue, since something could be not blue and be anyway not 
red (i.e.,yellow). Therefore “Red(x)↔~ Blue (x)” does not support the conjecture 
considered in (a). 
As regards b), an important reason to refuse it, is that such an assumption, if 
accepted, would anticipate the idea of internal relations which Wittgenstein 
adopted as a new perspective afterwards and in some opposition to the theories 
contained in Tractatus. 
Accepting b) would imply introducing a “linked to content” constraint, for the 
logical structure of objects would depend on properties and relations that hold for 
a certain domain of objects and not for another: in phenomenological terms, it 
would concern material a priori propositions. 
This assumption then would be in contrast with the purely formal character of the 
contradiction whose falsehood does not depend on the kind of object considered. 
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Therefore, with regard to the colour exclusion problem , we are confronted with a 
conflict between something that is considered a priori ( in virtue of his 
impossibility) and at the same time something (the same) which, according to the 
criteria of the Tractatus, cannot satisfy the requirements of being a contradiction: 
to some extent, a conflict between the analytical and the synthetical character of 
the proposition. 
In fact it’s impossible to consider R(p)t.B(p)t as a contradiction, since it is not 
false for every substitution instance (Bolzano’s principle). 
The solution to this impasse could be to consider propositions like those 
concerning colours as examples of a universal validity for a certain domain, as far 
these kind of propositions keep their truth-value in every substitution instance 
only with individual and predicative constants of the same kind. 
 
2. Synthetic a priori laws 
The above sketched solution is adopted by the phenomenological approach, 
particularly by Husserl in the Third Logical Investigation, where he introduces the 
notion of “syntethische Gesezten a priori”. 
According to Husserl, a synthetic a priori law is a “ pure law, which includes 
material concepts, so as not to permit of a formalization of these concepts salva 
veritate „.7 
Content concepts (Sachhaltige Begriffe) are concepts whose character is not 
purely formal: while formal concepts deal with the empty ideas of something and 
object, so that the axioms that express their use are ontological-formal, on the 
contrary material concepts are gathered around different categories, genera, which 
concern different kinds of objects, different kinds of states of affair (Sachhalten). 
Husserl explicates the notion of „logical form“ as: 
 
Concepts like Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, order, 
ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc., have a basically different character from concepts 
like House, Tree, Colour, Tone, Space, Sensation, Feeling etc., which for their part express 
genuine content. Whereas the former group themselves round the empty notion of Something or 
Object as such, and are associated with this through formal ontological axioms, the latter are 
disposed about various highest material Genera or categories, in which material ontologies have 
their root. This cardinal division between the ‚formal‘ and the ‚material‘ spheres of Essence gives 
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us the true distinction between the analytically a priori and the synthetically a priori  disciplines 
(or laws and necessities).8 
 
Husserl, as it were, enlarges and enriches the notion of “logical form” which in 
Wittgenstein is firmly tied up to Bolzano’s criterion based on the keeping of the 
truth-value in every substitution-instance; he, however, preserves this criterion 
even if the introduction of the notion of “formal” seems more articulated in 
comparison with its use in the past. 
Wittgenstein, like Schlick9, would not admit the phenomenological notion of  
“formal”, considering his concept of logical truth tied up to tautology. 
That is the reason why they (Wittgenstein and Schlick) use the examples which 
are not suitable to capture completely this notion10, in order to explain the 
Husserlian notion of “material a priori”. 
The examples like “every note has a pitch” (Schlick) or “every rod has a length” 
(Wittgenstein) cannot be considered as material a priori propositions insofar, in 
doing so, we would misunderstand Husserl’s real intentions; in Husserl’s point of 
view, as it were, material a priori propositions are propositions like “there is not a 
colour without extension” or “there is not a pitch without a duration”. 
Why does this misunderstanding arise? 
Husserl distinguishes between conjoined and disjoined parts: conjoined parts have 
at least a part in common, while disjoined parts have nothing in common with 
regard to their content: if, for example, we consider the genus “colour” and the 
specie “red”, we can assume that they are conjoined, for the genus “colour” is a 
part (intensional) of the specie “red”; on the contrary, “extension” does not 
belong, as a part, to the genus “colour”: “extension”, as a matter of fact, makes 
“colour” part of a more inclusive whole which is called “coloured surface”; only 
this whole has as its parts both “colour” and “extension”; “extension” then, 
according to Husserl, is not a part of the genus “colour”. 
Husserl supports the idea as follows: 
 
In the unity of a sensory phenomenon we can perhaps discover a wholly determinate “moment” of 
redness as well as the generic “moment” of colour. Colour and determinate redness are not, 
however, disjoined “moments”. Redness on the other hand, and the extension that it covers, are 
such disjoined moments, since they have no community of content. They have, we may say, a 
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mutual association in the widest sense of the word; we have here a general relation of parts which 
is that of disjoined parts of a whole, an association of such parts. It now seems appropriate to call 
the associated parts members of the association: but to give so wide a sense to talk about members 
of a whole, means to count colour and shape as the associated parts of a coloured expanse11. 
 
On the ground of these considerations, note and pitch are not disjoined parts 
because it is thanks to a pitch that a note is different from a noise. 
For Husserl, every relation of dependence or independence between contents is a 
relation which holds good only of disjoined parts. 
Conjoined parts, as a matter of fact, are so strong mutually interwoven that it has 
no sense to think of their non-independence; material a priori, therefore, 
describes only non independent connections which cannot be understood as joined 
parts. 
It is only because of the disjunction between parts that the empirical judgements 
as well as the  material a priori ones can be called “synthetic”. 
Examples like “every rod has a length” or “every note has a pitch” are not apt to 
be subsumed under material a priori propositions: in Husserl point of view, only 
propositions like “there isn’t a colour without extension” or “there isn’t a pitch 
without a duration” get the problem of the material a priori in the right 
perspective; the parts which constitute this kind of contents lie, as matter of 
course, at the same level. 
Consider the argument adopted by Wittgenstein once more: we assume that a 
proposition like “an object cannot be red and green at the same time” is a 
synthetic judgment and that the word “cannot” means a logical impossibility; we 
know that every proposition is the negation of its negation and therefore it is 
correct to formulate the proposition “an object can be red and green at the same 
time”. If we maintain the first assumption, the last proposition turns out as a 
synthetic one; as synthetic it has sense and this means that the situation described 
by it can exist; but if we admit that “cannot” means a logical impossibility, we 
arrive at the conclusion that the impossible is possible. 
The problem arises, according to Wittgenstein, when from the fact that a 
proposition has a sense we infer the possibility of its existence; for Husserl the 
negation of a synthetic a priori proposition (e.g. “there isn’t a colour without 
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extension”) has its sense even if the situation which this proposition describes 
cannot subsist. 
 
3. Wittgenstein’s colour concept 
The concept of colour recurs persistently in Wittgenstein’s philosophy; in the 
Tractatus he introduces not only the notion of “colour-space”, that appears in his 
later writings, but he also regards colour as one of the forms of objects.12 
Wittgenstein’s remark that colour is the form of the object confirms the surmise 
that what he means by colour is not what we can know by means of physical or 
chemical examination, but what we know immediately from experience: just as we 
cannot perceive a stick without a length, thus 
we cannot imagine an object without a visual field; the approach seems here to be 
a phenomenological one. Colour is one of the built-in logical forms in our 
immediate experience. 
According to this point of view, it is the structure of colour, its logical form, that 
determines the impossibility of a point in visual space having two different 
colours at the same time: the analysis of colour thus becomes a conceptual one, 
not a physical, physiological, or psychological one. 
A phenomenological colour theory is “a theory in pure phenomenology in which 
mention is only made of what is actually perceptible and in which non 
hypothetical objects occur”13. 
Wittgenstein’s aim is to reveal the logical structure of colours, avoiding to add 
any hypothetical elements of physics; this conceptual analysis is based on colours 
in colour-space. Wittgenstein thinks that the usual and familiar way of 
representing colours is misleading, because it would be based on the colour-circle 
notion which lays down some difficulties as noted by Wittgenstein in his 
Philosophical Remarks: 
 
At any rate, orange is a mixture of red and yellow in a sense in which yellow isn’t a mixture of red 
and green, although yellow comes between red and green in the colour circle14. 
 
In the “colour-circle” frame in fact, orange lies between red and yellow, and 
yellow between red and green; but we do not produce yellow by mixing red and 
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green, as we produce orange from red and yellow: the two colours obey to 
different grammatical laws, so that the colour-circle is inappropriate to represent 
correctly the colours structure. For this reason, Wittgenstein proposes to use the 
colour-octahedron scheme for the right representation of colours we immediately 
experience. 
The colour-octahedron is a good candidate for representing the colour-space, 
since it shows the correct grammar pertaining to the logical structure of colours; 
this representation cannot be established empirically by experiment, because it has 
an a priori status: 
 
An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e.g., provides a rough representation of 
colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation , not a psychological one. On the other hand, 
to say that in such and such circumstances  you can see red after-image (say) is a matter of 
psychology. (This may, or may not, be the case- the other is a priori: we can establish the one by 
experiment but not the other.)15  
 
With reference to the inappropriateness of the colour-circle to represent all the 
grammatical forms embodied by colours, Wittgenstein says that the two statement 
“Orange lies between red and yellow” and “Red lies between violet and orange” 
involve two different grammatical usages of the word “between”. Using the 
colour-circle, we are misled to think that there is a uniform transition from colour 
to colour, so that the two different usages of the word “between” become not 
understandable. 
For example, in the case of primary colours, we do not have an image of a 
continuous transition, for we see only the discrete hues; moreover, we cannot 
produce the primary colours by mixing other intermediate colours.16 
For Wittgenstein, it is fruitful to produce a better representation of colours, 
drawing a square which distinguishes four “corner-points” where we can locate 
the primary colours: blue, green, yellow and red; if we add to the previous square 
black and white, we are naturally driven to use an octahedron whose bottom and 
top corner-points would represent black and white respectively. The latter colours, 
as a matter of fact, are radically different, as regards their grammatical form, from 
the other ones. 
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Wittgenstein’s concern is here, as stated above, a grammatical one: grammar, in 
this context, replaces his early-period concept of logic; but grammar in the case of 
colours seems susceptible to phenomenological considerations, as is suggested by 
the following remarks: 
 
The words ‘Colour’, ‘Sound’, ‘Number’ etc. could appear in the chapter headings of our grammar. 
They need not occur within the chapter but that is where their structure is given.17 
 
Is not, to make an example, the theory of harmony, at least, in part 
phenomenology and in part grammar? 
 
The theory of harmony isn’t a matter of taste.18 
 
The way in which musical notes are combined to produce a chord is not a matter 
of taste, but is somehow already built into each note. 
Grammar and phenomenology have in cases like this the same function for the 
fact that they allow some combinations of words, while excluding other 
combinations as nonsense: it is a nonsense to say that one colour smells or that a 
colour is a tone higher than another. 
Another grammatical example is provided by Wittgenstein’s denial to apply the 
words  “closer to” and “further from” to colour concepts.19 It is important to 
underline once more that by talking about colour, Wittgenstein uses a logical 
analysis of colour concepts based on colour-space: 
 
The specific effort made for this by him is to find the better, if not the right, representation of 
colour-space. In fact, Wittgenstein sees that the colour-octahedron, in contrast to the colour-circle, 
is a grammatical representation of colour-space.20 
 
For the Wittgenstein of the early period, colours are objects with logical forms: 
logical forms are given together with objects; in other words, objects have a built-
in feature of logical forms. All we need is thus to experience objects. 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of separate logical forms allows the reduction of all the 
logical forms to the logical forms of simple objects: all the complex logical forms 
have to be built out of the logical forms of simple objects. Between logical forms 
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and facts there is an isomorphic relation: the basic idea of Wittgenstein’s picture 
theory is that an elementary proposition is a picture of reality by  being an 
isomorphic copy of the corresponding state of affairs. 
However, what about complex propositions? Wittgenstein has to explain how we 
understand complex propositions as pictures of reality, extending his picture 
theory, applied initially to elementary propositions, to all propositions. The 
solution adopted by Wittgenstein is the truth-function theory as expressed 
explicitly in proposition 5 of the Tractatus: 
 
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. 
 
Returning to the colour issue of the early Wittgenstein, the logical forms of 
colours determine the way in which colours are combined in our experience; the 
vocabulary of colour terms is based on the acquaintance with colours in visual 
space. Colours are for the early Wittgenstein phenomenological objects because 
they have built-in logical forms within themselves: colour-incompatibility, as 
pointed above, is a phenomenological question; for the same reason there is a 
great difference between physical impossibility and logical impossibility. 
In the Blue Book Wittgenstein asserts: 
 
Let us think straight away of a similar case: “The colours green and blue can’t be in the same place 
simultaneously.” Here the picture of physical impossibility which suggests itself is, perhaps, not 
that of a barrier : rather we feel that the two colours are in each other’s way. What is the origin of 
this idea?- We say three people can’t sit side by side on this bench; they have no room. Now the 
case of the colours is no analogous to this: but it is somewhat analogous to saying: “3x 18 inches 
won’t go into 3 feet.” This is a grammatical rule and stats a logical impossibility.21 
 
Once again Wittgenstein here is concerned with phenomenology and not with 
physics: as it were, with what we immediately know without any empirical testing. 
Finding by means of grammatical investigations of language, the logic that lies 
behind immediate experience, we put forward the assimilation of grammar to 
phenomenology. 
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Even if Wittgenstein rejects phenomenological language, he still believes that a 
phenomenological analysis remains possible, for language still mirrors reality, 
even if in a different way compared to the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein explains the rules of the use of language as follows: 
 
The investigation of the rules of the use of our language, the recognition of these rules, and their 
clearly surveyable representation amounts to, i.e. accomplishes the same thing as, what one often 
wants to achieve in constructing a phenomenological language. 
Each time we recognize that such and such a mode of presentation can be replaced by another one, 
we take a step toward that goal.22 
 
4. The use of the term “phenomenology” in Wittgenstein’s works 
 
According to Jaakko Hintikka, the use of the term “phenomenology” in Husserl 
and in Wittgenstein has a common source: the term at stake had an established 
usage in the early decades of the 20th century in the philosophy of physics 
according to which science ought to deal only with observable objects, rejecting 
pure concepts.23 
Husserl acknowledges himself that his phenomenology can be considered as a 
radicalisation of Mach’s phenomenology24: the affinity ,as regards the idea of 
phenomenology, between Husserl and Mach is never been emphasized. 
Hintikka contends that it can be demonstrated that Wittgenstein is familiar with 
this sense of the term “phenomenology”: for instance, the Austrian philosopher 
possessed several volumes of Boltzmann’s writings who used the very word 
“Phänomenologie”. 
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy however was, in some sense, a result of the 
revision of Russell’s theory of acquaintance achieved by omitting logical forms 
from the range of objects of acquaintance; in addition to this, it would be a 
misunderstanding to assimilate the simple objects contained in the Tractatus with 
physical atoms: simple objects, as a matter of facts, are basic entities directly 
given to us. 
Like Boltzmann and Hertz, the Austrian philosopher was concerned primarily 
with the representation of the given reality in thought and in language; 
Boltzmann, for example, referred to those representations as “pictures” (Bilder). 
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Wittgenstein kept up with the ideas of Boltzmann and Hertz, while considering 
the possibility of solving conceptual problems by devising a suitable notation: this 
is the case of the above mentioned problem of colour incompatibility. 
Proposition 6.3751 of the Tractatus asserts: 
 
For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is 
impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour. 
 
Let us think  how this contradiction appears in physics: a particle cannot have two 
velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be at two places at the same 
time; as a matter of fact, particles that are in different places cannot be identical. 
It has been recognized that here Wittgenstein’s reference to physics serves to 
explain rather than to solve colour incompatibility: he  aims, as it were, at the 
development of a notation capable of turning colour incompatibility into a 
tautology. According to Hertz, the first task of a physicist is to develop a system 
of concepts (“images”) regulated by laws which govern the phenomena they 
represent. 
It is also worth stating the fact that, according to the Austrian philosopher, reality 
is phenomenological; this implies that reality determines how it ought to be 
represented: a correct notation, if possible, could represent perfectly reality, 
rendering the question about the adopted methods idle. 
According to Jaakko Hintikka, Wittgenstein’s philosophical development in 1929 
was the replacement of the phenomenological language given in Tractatus by an 
everyday physicalistic language as the only possible language in philosophy. 
In the first section of Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein states: 
 
I do not now have phenomenological language, or “primary language” as I used to call it, in mind 
as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary25. 
 
Wittgenstein goes further, affirming that a phenomenological language is not 
possible; there is a formulation in Waismann's Ludwig Wittgenstein and the 
Vienna Circle, which is striking as to clear up the point above: 
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I used to believe that there was the everyday language that we all usually spoke  and a primary 
language that expressed what we really knew, namely phenomena. I also spoke of a first system 
and a second system. Now I wish to explain why I do not adhere to that conception any more. I 
think that essentially we have only one language, everyday language.26 
 
From the quoted passages above, we could argue that Wittgenstein, starting from 
1929, was concerned with a change of the language paradigm. 
Calling for further explanations, we have to ask whether or not there is any 
difference between an everyday language and a physicalistic language. The 
answer is very clear: 
 
The propositions of our grammar are always of the same sort as propositions of physics and not of 
the same sort as the “primary” propositions which treat of what is immediate.27 
 
The change of the language paradigm however does not mean for Wittgenstein to 
give up the initial goals of his philosophical enterprise. 
It is worth noting that albeit a comparison with the Tractatus shows little 
difference as regard the switching of the language paradigm towards a 
phenomenological basic language, Wittgenstein, however does not speak 
anywhere in the Tractatus or in the Notebooks 1914-1916  of a “primary 
language” or a “primary system”: a term like “primary system” is used by 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Remarks.28 It may be supposed, according to 
Hintikka, that Wittgenstein uses these terms while discussing with members of the 
Vienna Circle. 
However, in the Big Typescript it is shown that even if Wittgenstein is no longer 
engaged in a construction of a phenomenological language, he nevertheless is 
interested in the same phenomenological problems as before. 
Of particular interest is his assertion that “phenomenology is grammar”; this 
identification of phenomenology and grammar will play a great role also in 
Remarks on Colour29. 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of all natural hypotheses and theories affords him the 
access that he needs for the phenomenological descriptions of time, space and 
colour. 
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A phenomenology of time is radically different from the physics of time; 
analogously, a phenomenology of space gives us the evidence of the fact that 
objective, physical space is a construction based on subjective, visual space. 
Therefore, a phenomenological investigation of space would isolate space from its 
owner, from the sense organs, and from all the physical theories of space. For this 
reason phenomenological geometry will not be Euclidean (nor Riemannian, etc.): 
phenomenology is not interested in the validity of this or that theory, but in the 
general structure of experience as a whole. 
In The Big Typescript Wittgenstein asserts: 
 
The geometry of our visual space is given to us, i.e. finding it doesn’t require an investigation 
hitherto hidden facts. In the sense of a physical psychological investigation, our isn’t one at all. 
Nevertheless, one can say that we don’t yet know this geometry. This geometry is grammar, and 
our investigation is a grammatical investigation.30 
 
Taking a step forward, we find in the same chapter of the Big Typescript: 
 
One could talk almost about an external and internal geometry. What is arranged in visual space is 
situated in this kind of order a priori, i.e. by virtue of its logical nature, and in this case geometry 
is simply grammar. What the physicist puts in relation to each other within the geometry of 
physical space are readings from instruments that, by virtue of their internal nature, are no 
different whether we are living in a flat or a spherical physical space. That is to say, it isn’t an 
investigation into the logical properties of these readings that leads the physicist to an assumption 
about the nature of physical space, but the facts that he has read off.31 
 
Making phenomenological research, we are not concerned with facts, but only 
with possibilities: 
here, according to Nicholas Gier32, the closeness of Wittgenstein to the last 
Husserl.  
Wittgenstein’s realization that colour incompatibility cannot be reduced to formal, 
logical contradiction has prompted some interpreters to see the work Remarks on 
colours as something very close to a disintegration of the Tractatus. Peter Hacker 
explains this idea as: 
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...Wittgenstein’s first philosophy collapsed over its inability to solve one problem- colour 
exclusion. Once the intractability of this problem became clear, the main struts of the whole 
system collapsed.33 
 
Another interpreter like Anthony Kenny, however, admits that the apparent 
mixing of the logical and the empirical entailed by the recognition of a logic of 
colour may be seen indeed only as the development of Wittgenstein’s holding that 
the truth-functional logic of the Tractatus is fundamentally an applied one: logic 
in Tractatus is not cut off from the world, since it has to recognize the existence 
of something or the being of facts. 
By acknowledging the existence of a colour-space, Wittgenstein strengthened the 
essential connection between logical syntax and its application in the description 
of empirical states of affairs. 
Holding this point of view, Wittgenstein’s later conception of logical syntax can 
be seen as a widening rather than an abandonment of his earlier view: 
 
Against Wittgenstein’s new view [of logical syntax] Schlick protested that the truth functional 
constants seemed to be more essential to language than the particular rules of syntax. The 
possibility of constructing conjunctive propositions, he said, seemed to be a much more general, 
all-embracing fact than the rule of syntax that red and blue could not be in the same place. But 
Wittgenstein replied that he thought there was non crucial distinction here. The rules for the truth-
functions were  not to be separated from other rules of syntax. “Both” he said “belong to the 
method of depicting the world”.34 
 
However, according to Marie Macginn, Wittgenstein’s commitment to the 
independence of elementary propositions in Tractatus counts as a commitment to 
the purity of logic; therefore it is difficult to make completely compatible this 
position with the later positions which insist more on the applicability of  logic: 
recognizing that colour exclusion cannot be reduced to a formal contradiction, 
Wittgenstein takes a closer step towards the persuasion that a pure formal logic is 
a myth. 
Indeed, the central distinction between system of representation and its 
application, put in other words, between form and content, remains intact in the 
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later works of Wittgenstein, even if the concept of form  is transformed into social 
or cultural constraints. 
Therefore, we can admit that there is a certain continuity in Wittgenstein’s 
development, at least as regards to the problems which are at stake when we 
confront language with the world. 
While tackling the problem of colour exclusion in Some Remarks on Logical 
Form, Wittgenstein is still persuaded that logic does not deal with the internal 
construction of elementary propositions: 
 
We can only arrive at a correct analysis [of elementary propositions] by, what might be called, the 
logical investigation of phenomena, i.e. in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing 
about a priori possibilities.35 
 
In other words, Wittgenstein no longer believes that analysis would arrive at 
elementary propositions that are logically independent; on the contrary, we can 
assert a priori that there are internal or hierarchical relations that exist between 
elementary propositions belonging to particular logical fields: i.e. propositions 
which deal with space, colours, sounds etc. 
Moreover, he believes that such a hierarchical relationship is to be envisaged in 
terms of the hierarchy of the number system: 
 
For their representation numbers (rational and irrational) must enter into then structure of the 
atomic propositions themselves.36 
 
Colour propositions, in this view, are founded on a pure, a priori hierarchy 
analogous to that which determines the scale for measuring length; for this reason, 
elementary propositions of colour are related reciprocally in an analogous way to 
that which holds for propositions about lengths: propositions like “A is 1.5 metres 
tall” and “B is 1.9 metres tall”. 
According to this point of view, the colour exclusion problem can be cleared as 
follows: 
 
It is a characteristic of these properties that one degree of them excludes any other. One shade of 
colour cannot simultaneously have two different degrees of brightness or redness, a tone not two 
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different strengths, etc. And the important point here is that these remarks do not express an 
experience but are in some sense tautologies.37 
 
At this point of analysis, Wittgenstein manifests the clear conviction that, 
admitted the completeness of the analysis of colour propositions, such nonsensical 
constructions like “A is red and A is green” may be avoided by virtue of the 
symbolism which expresses the propositions themselves. 
Wittgenstein explicates: 
 
These [rules of syntax] will have to tell us that in the case of certain kinds of atomic propositions 
described in terms of definite symbolic features certain combinations of the T’s and F’s [in the 
truth-table] must be left out.38 
 
This early response to the problem of colour exclusion keeps the myth of a pure a 
priori still alive, that is to say, the myth of a pure formal syntax able to make clear 
the internal connections between propositions. 
However, the idea of a colour-scale represents a development as regards the 
Tractatus conception of the logic of our language. 
As Marie Mcginn explains: 
 
The system of logical syntax that is embedded in our language is now seen to be ineluctably tied 
up with the existence of descriptive conventions ( specifically properties of degree) whose 
application is a matter, not merely of there being a world, but of our employing particular modes 
of describing it. Logic has, in a sense, become more closely tied up with the world than it is in the 
excessively pure conception of the Tractatus.39 
 
 
In this view, Some Remarks on Logical Form can be acknowledged as the first 
step on the road from logic to grammar. 
By the end of 1929, the notion of elementary proposition deals no more with the 
idea of a complete analysis, but simply with surface properties of propositions; 
with regard to the system of colours, Wittgenstein believes that it has no longer 
the same multiplicity as lengths: we cannot, for example, say how many degrees 
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closer to red one orange is than another. The number system therefore is no more 
the real ground of the internal relations that exist between colours. 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the completeness and importance of analysis goes 
along with his abandoning the idea of an essence of depiction. 
In Philosophical Investigations, he remarks: 
 
The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination 
round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the 
fixed point of our real need)40. 
 
In this new approach to the logic of language, Wittgenstein has come to see that 
its essence cannot be something universal or pure lying behind all systems of 
representation: the way by which the language does work is “in plain view” and 
manifest in the everyday use of language. What it matters is aiming at a clear view 
of the grammar that the everyday use of language makes evident. 
In the Tractatus, on the contrary, Wittgenstein synthesizes his conception of logic 
with the following words: 
 
Thought is surrounded by a halo.- Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of 
the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought. But 
this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all 
experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it- It must rather be of 
the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, 
indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is.41 
 
 
 5. Remarks on colours 
After having introduced some issues concerning colours, we can begin 
investigating all the philosophical problems connected with the work Remarks on 
colours written by Wittgenstein in the years 1950-1951. 
In this text, more than in others, philosophy turns out to be an accurate and local 
analysis of the different uses of languages; he doubts whether a too generalised 
investigation of philosophical problems might allow to clarify the puzzles that 
emerges when we encounter the great variety of phenomenon which makes up the 
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reality; instead of it, it may be more reliable a method which doesn’t resolve the 
friction of the reality in theories which, in virtue of their pureness, lose every 
contact with the world. 
It is an operation of  intellectual desublimation which invests every field of 
culture: we must, according to Wittgenstein, avoid to transfigure the phenomenon 
belonging to our Lebenswelt idealizing and objectifying them in some abstracts 
and a priori; on the contrary, we have only to check the real and effective 
conditions of that phenomenon, of that Lebensformen, as Wittgenstein would have 
said. 
We have to think less and to attend more at the real world; philosophy does not 
aim anymore to bring hypothetical arguments, but to trace out descriptions of the 
investigated phenomenon. 
Wittgenstein clarifies his ideas about philosophy in the Philosophical 
Investigations as follows: 
 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe 
it. 
For it cannot give it any foundation either. 
It leaves everything as it is. 
It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it. A “leading 
problem of mathematical logic” is for us a problem of mathematics like any other.42 
 
He adds also:  
It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or 
logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of 
mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. (And this 
does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.) 
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then we 
follow the rules, things do not turn put as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were 
entangled in our own rules. 
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). 
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise 
than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: 
“I didn't mean it like that.” 
The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.43 
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Wittgenstein concludes: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.- Since 
everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no 
interest to us. 
One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all new discoveries and 
inventions44. 
 
Philosophy then might not work out a logical-mathematical contradiction, but 
clarify the “civil state” of the contradiction or its condition in the civil world: 
every form of knowledge, even the more sophisticated,  as a matter of course, is 
always rooted in our worldly praxis, in our, Husserl would have said, 
prepredicative commercium with our environment. 
Wittgenstein points out in The Blue Book: 
 
Now what makes it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality. 
This craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular 
philosophical confusions. There is- 
(a) The tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly 
subsume under a general term.- We are inclined to think that there must be something in common 
to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term 
“game” to the various games; whereas games form a family the members of which have family 
likeness.[...] 
(b)There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that the man who has 
learnt to understand a general term, say, the term “leaf”, has thereby come to possess a kind of 
general picture of leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves.[...] 
(c)Again, the idea we have of what happens when we get hold of the general idea “leaf”, “plant”, 
etc. etc., is connected with the confusion between a mental state, meaning a state of a hypothetical 
mental mechanism, and a mental state meaning a state of consciousness (toothache, etc.). 
(d)Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of 
science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest 
possible number of primitive natural laws.[...]Philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. 
I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain 
anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive”.[...] 
Instead of “craving for generality”  I could also have said “the contemptuous attitude towards the 
particular case”.[...] 
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The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common 
element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigations; for it has not only led to 
no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could 
have helped him to understand the usage of the general term. When Socrates asks the question, 
“what is knowledge?” he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of 
knowledge.45 
 
The problem that at this point of our analysis arises is whether the issues 
concerning colours constitute a relevant context of philosophical questions: 
colours questions are relevant, in my point of view, because they clear up very 
important problems of the philosophical and epistemological reflection, such as 
the kind of relation between logic and experience, or language and perception, or 
the possible relation between grammatical and empirical propositions. 
For example, Wittgenstein starts his enquiry on colours, bringing to the light the 
linguistic misunderstandings tied to propositions which have apparently the same 
logical form, even if their deep grammar makes these propositions very different 
one from the other. 
To report e.g. whether a body is lighter or darker than another is very different 
from stating the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour, 
even if the form of the propositions here concerned is the same: “X is lighter than 
Y”. 
Wittgenstein stresses a language-game as: 
 
A language-game: report whether a certain body is lighter or darker than another.- But now there’s 
a related one: State the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour. (Compare 
with this: Determining the relationship between the lengths of two sticks- and the relationship 
between two numbers.)- The form of the propositions on both language-games is the same: “X is 
lighter than Y”. But in  then first it is an external relations and the proposition is temporal, in the 
second it is an internal relation and the proposition is timeless.46 
 
Here we are concerned with linguistic misunderstandings, in other cases 
Wittgenstein attends to the riddles which pertain to the relation between 
perception and language (or thinking). 
An example which gets clear of the relation between perception and language is 
the following one: 
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I see in a photograph (not a colour photograph) a man with dark hair and a boy with slicked-back 
blond hair standing in front of lathe, which is made in part of castings painted black, and in part of 
smooth axles, gears, etc., and next to it a grating made of light galvanized wire. I see the finished 
iron surfaces as iron-coloured, the boy’s hair as blond, the grating as zinc-coloured, despite the 
fact that everything is depicted in lighter and darker tones of the photographic paper.47 
 
About the analogy between colours and language-games or their inscription in 
forms of life, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Ask this question: Do you know what “reddish” means? And how do you show that you know it? 
Language-games: “Point to a reddish yellow (white, blue, brown)- “Point to an even more reddish 
one”- “A less reddish one” etc. Now that you’ve mastered this game you will be told “Point to a 
somewhat reddish green” Assume there are two cases: Either you do point to a colour (and always 
the same one), perhaps to an olive green- or you say, “I don’t know what that means,” or “There’s 
no such thing.” 
We might be inclined to say that the one person had a different colour concept from the other; or a 
different concept of ‘…ish’.48 
 
From the passage above we may argue that different men can have different 
concepts of colour, and when this happens then, according to Wittgenstein, these 
men live in different practical, theoretical contexts or Lebensformen. It  could 
seem thus that it is impossible to find any bridge-concepts capable of assuring the 
translation or reduction of a concept belonging to a particular form of life to 
another one which is proper to a different Lebensform. 
We would have in this hypothetical case people having a “different geometry of 
colour”; we find ourselves so in situations in which the common understanding is 
very difficult to yield: 
 
There may be mental defectives who cannot be taught the concept ‘tomorrow’, or the concept ‘I’, 
no to tell time. Such people would not learn the use of the word ‘tomorrow’ etc.. 
Now to whom can I describe what these people cannot learn? Just to one who has learnt it? Can’t I 
tell A that B cannot learn higher mathematics, even though A hasn’t mastered it? Doesn’t the 
person who has learned the game understand the word “chess” differently from someone who 
hasn’t learnt it? There are differences between the use of the word which the former can make, and 
the use which the latter has learnt.49  
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The problem arisen at this point of the analysis grows further if we do not fix the 
kind of relation subsisting  between colour-games and reality. In fact, if we admit 
that colours words point to the private sphere of the subject (like sensations), then 
the only way to verify if two subjects intend  colour-words in the same way, is to 
attend to the  subjects’ use of the same word in equal circumstances. No other 
warranty is allowed. But if the link between language-games and reality is totally 
interrupted, then we have no means of comparing words each other; this is a very 
crucial point to which Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka recur in their work 
Investigating Wittgenstein: have colours-concepts a zero semantic? According to 
them, no! Because of the fact that language-games like that of colours are basilar 
or primitive games on which all the other are grounded, if we don’t permit any 
kind of link between word-colours and reality, then we expose the other higher 
games to the danger of being inconsistent or of being nonsensical. 
According to Jaakko and Merrill  Hintikka in fact, Wittgenstein seems to assert 
that all that matters in colour issues concerns modes of behaviour: all this implies 
that colour-language ought to be public and completely different from colour-
impressions. 
For instance, in Remarks on Colour, Wittgenstein, discussing the difference 
between a colour-blind and a normal person, writes: 
 
The one can learn a language-game that the other one cannot. And indeed this must be what 
constitutes colour-blindness of all kinds. For if the “colour-blind” person could learn all the 
language-games of normal people, why should he be excluded from certain professions?50 
 
From the passage above, we are inclined to assume that colour-blindness is  not a 
question of colour experiences or impressions very different from those of normal 
persons, but merely a matter of difference in the language-games that one can 
learn while the other can’t.51 
But these are not Wittgenstein’s last words concerning colour-language; indeed, 
he asserts explicitly that sets of concepts, like sensations and colours, operate in 
analogous ways: 
 
I treat colour concepts like the concepts of sensations.52 
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The colour concepts are to be treated like the concepts of sensations.53 
 
 The analogy looks wrong-headed and even paradoxical54: primary language-
games which establish the semantical links between private sensations and the 
language by which we express them rely on spontaneous expressions of different 
sensations. 
However, this is not the case of the colour-language: according to Wittgenstein 
we must, as a matter of fact, avoid every use of a psychological interpretation of 
colour issues; colours have any kind of effect (sensuous, moral,) on the subject 
who sees them. 
Colour-language is e.g. radically different from physiognomic games: in which 
e.g. the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it; it does 
mean that in physiognomic games the modes of behaviour, which render the game 
public, can be replaced by speech-acts. In the case of colour-words however, 
saying that their meanings consist in expressive or linguistic behaviour seems 
absurd: 
 
Wittgenstein’s favourite, albeit admittedly oversimplified, example of such a language-game is a 
game of colour comparisons played by means of colour samples or colour charts. The public 
framework (samples or charts relied on in such games) is of course nonlinguistic and 
nonbehavioural. Hence it may seem again that the analogy Wittgenstein sees between sensation-
language and colour-language is spurious.55 
 
With the parallelism between colour-words and sensation-words, Wittgenstein is 
interested in the searching for a public framework in which they both can be 
expressed; in this sense, we can understand why does Wittgenstein need a 
language-game in which colour-words play a role. Language-games, in fact, are 
always public in principle; according to this point of view, we can also understand 
why the simplest public framework for colour-words is represented by the 
physical colour samples. The analogy however between this kind of language-
game and the physiognomic one demonstrates that the primitive game constituted 
by colour words cannot work if we want to avoid ridiculous consequences. For 
this reason, we have to search for another and better account of the grammar of 
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colour-words; another candidate, relied on remembered colour-images, is sharply 
rejected by Wittgenstein: 
 
But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) 
that a word stands for? – “And if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind’s eye when we 
utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible for us to remember, it must be in itself 
indestructible.”- But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?- When we work 
with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances in which we say that the sample has 
changed colour and we judge of this by memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening 
(for example) of our memory-image? Aren’t we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample? 
(For someone might feel like saying : “If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a 
sample”.)- Or perhaps of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to paint a 
particular colour  “C”, which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y 
combined.- Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than another; would you not 
sometimes say: “ I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday”? This shews that 
we do not always resort to what memory tell us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.56 
 
How, then, may we describe the primary language-game played by colour-words? 
If we use the colour-sample game to describe the rules of the primary language-
game instantiated by colour-words, we are wrong. 
According to Wittgenstein as a matter of fact, there is not a lot to say about these 
rules: the language-game with colour-words does work only if the colour-
identification is made correctly. 
Rule-following is constitutive of the language-game in question, and nothing more 
can be said: a language-game is played and nothing more; primary rules are 
followed “blindly”, “automatically” and “as a matter of course”. 
This is the reason why everyone is tempted initially to understand Wittgenstein’s 
description of the language-game with colour-words as a rejection of inner 
experiences57. 
By emphasizing the analogy between “sensation concepts” and “colour concepts”, 
we are forced to admit that in both language-games basic attributions are made 
without any further justification: people’s verbal reactions to their colour 
experiences can be as spontaneous, primitive and automatic as their reactions to 
sensations. 
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Just as it is impossible, i.e. in a physiognomic language-game to make a 
distinction between having an impression and giving it its natural expression, for 
the same reason it would be impossible to drive a wedge between physical colours 
and colour-impressions. 
Wittgenstein emphasizes this point by giving a striking analogy: 
 
Someone paints a picture in order to shew how he imagines a theatre scene. And now I say: “This 
picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words inform- but for the one who 
gives the information it is a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is 
the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. To him his private impression of the picture 
means what he has imagined, in a sense in which the picture cannot mean this to others.”- And 
what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information- if these 
words were rightly used in the first case?58 
 
Taking this interpretative path, we do not find essential difference between 
sensation concepts and colour concepts even if we admit that colours have a 
clearer structure than sensations. 
However, Wittgenstein never tells us what the language-games with colours are 
really like: this would depend, according to Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill Hintikka, 
on the “enormous complexity and subtlety” of this kind of language-game. 
Remarks on Colours is then an attempt to deal with this  irreducible complexity: 
we are confronted therefore with many dimensions by which the space of colours 
can be articulated: proximity (relating to the shade of a colour) vs. distance, pure 
vs. impure colours, opacity vs. transparency. In order  to have a deeper 
investigation on colour-issues, we have then to connect colour-concepts with 
other concepts from the world of vision: 
 
Because of this many-dimensional character of colour concepts, Wittgenstein follows his wonted 
strategy of merely assembling reminders of the relevant conceptual points concerning colours. We, 
too, have to be satisfied with the same.59. 
 
When we use colour-concepts or colour-words we have to do with vague concepts 
for which it's very difficult to achieve some sharpness or to draw boundaries; the 
task to draw sharp boundaries is due to logic, but not the everyday language. 
Wittgenstein explains logic in The Big Typescript as: 
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It is as if for certain games one draws a line right trough the middle of the playing field in order to 
separate the teams, but doesn't otherwise mark off the field, since this isn't necessary. 
When Frege says that logic doesn't know what to do with vague concepts, this is true in so  far it is 
precisely the sharpness of  concepts that belongs to the method of logic. That is what the 
expression “Logic is normative” can refer to. 
[...]It is essential to logic to draw boundaries, but not such boundaries are drawn in the language 
we speak. But this doesn't mean that logic represents language incorrectly, or that it represents an 
ideal language. Its task is to portray a colourful, blurred reality as a pen-and-ink drawing.60  
 
If we  try to analyze colour-words, we cannot recur to “pen-and-ink” conceptual 
schemes even if some, as it were, “regularities”, some unassailable truths (e.g. the 
octahedron frame) must be presupposed to match colour issues. In our attempt to 
describe uses of colour-words, we must admit 1)that some sentences are often 
used on the borderline between logic and the empirical; 2) that in philosophy it is 
not enough in every case to say something about an object, but also to learn how 
to speak about it. 
 
And don't I have to admit that sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the 
empirical, so that their meaning shifts back and forth and they are now expressions of norms, now 
treated as expressions of experience? 
For it is not the 'thought' (an accompanying mental phenomenon) but its use (something that 
surrounds it), that distinguishes the logical proposition from the empirical one.61 
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